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"THEIR PRESERVATION IS OUR SACRED
TRUST"' JUDICIALLY MANDATED FREE
EXERCISE EXEMPTIONS TO HISTORIC
PRESERVATION ORDINANCES UNDER
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V SMITH
Abstract: Religious property owners have both successfully and unsuc-
cessfully challenged historic preservation ordinances as burdens on the
free exercise of religion. Courts considering this conflict typically rely on
Employment Division v. Smith, in which the United States Supreme Court
held that neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden
religion are not subject to strict scrutiny. Ambiguities in Smith, however,
have left courts free to use their own interpretive discretion and have
made attempts to apply free exercise precedent particularly difficult in
the historic preservation context. This Note reviews the historic
preservation movement and free exercise jurisprudence, then analyzes
cases that have attempted to balance these two often conflicting interests.
The Note argues that the strictures of Smith are too rigid, producing
results either over- or under-inclusive of free exercise rights. Only through
the application of a case by case balancing test can courts adequately
adjudicate inevitable free exercise/historic preservation conflicts.
INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the Bill of Rights wrote the Free Exercise Clause
to ensure that the United States government did not directly impose
restrictions on any citizen's religious beliefs or practices. 2
 Conflicts
between government action and religious practice are inevitable,
however, because United States citizens practice such a variety of relig-
ious faiths that, often, religious conduct necessarily conflicts with the
regulations of either federal, state, or local governments. 3 Therefore,
I Hillary Rodham Clinton, Preserving America's Story, tit SAVING AMERICA'S TREASURES
7, 8 (Dwight Young ed., 2001).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I; GREGG IVERS, REDEFINING THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF STATE POWER 133 (1993).
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (articulating that there were almost
300 religious denominations in the United States in 1961); cf. Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (stating that the current diversity of religious beliefs prevents the
Court from granting exemptions to neutral laws that incidentally burden religion).
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throughout the history of free exercise jurisprudence, the United
States Supreme Court has considered free exercise challenges to gov-
ernment regulations ranging from mandatory Sunday closing laws to
compÜlsory school attendance laws. 4
Currently, the debate whether the application of historic preser-
vation ordinances to historic religious properties violates the Free Ex-
ercise Clause is one of the most prominent in free exercise jurispru-
dence.5
 Some religious property owners desire an exemption from
landmark designation because it imposes upkeep costs and limits on
renovation that are financially burdensome' Municipalities are very
reluctant to grant exemptions, however, because historic preservation
has become such an important tool in building community character
and revitalizing urban economies.? Litigation results when the two
sides cannot compromise; and religious property owners have alleged
in court that preservation ordinances impose an Unconstitutional free
exercise burden' Courts are left with the difficult task of deciding
whether the Constitution's protection of free exercise rights trumps
the government's preservation interests and in turn requires an ex-
emption to the preservation ordinance for the historic religious
property owner. 9
Courts considering this conflict typically rely on the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decision, in 1990, in Employment Division u. Smith. 1 °
Ambiguities in Smith, however, have left courts free to use their own
4 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) ("[W]e granted the writ of cer-
tiorari in this case to review a decision ... holding that respondents' convictions of violat-
ing the State's compulsory school attendance law were invalid under the Free Exercise
Clause."); B ra nfeld, 366 U.S. at 600 ("This case concerns the constitutional validity of the
application to appellants of the Pennsylvania criminal statute, enacted in 1959, which pro-
scribes the Sunday retail sale of certain enumerated commodities.").
5
 Compare Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Lim-
its to Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 Vim.. L. REV. 401, 402 (1991) (argu-
ing for the exemption of historic religious properties from preservation ordinances in all
cases because the ordinances infringe upon the free exercise of religion}, with Laura S.
Nelson, Remove Not the Ancient Landmark Legal Protection for Historic Religious Properties in an
Age of Religious Freedom Legislation, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 721, 730 (1999) (arguing for a de-
nial of exemptions to preservation laws for religious property owners because of the det-
rimental effect it will have on communities).
6 See Alan C. Weinstein, The Myth of Ministry Lk Mortar: A Legal and Policy Analysis of
Landmark Designation of Religious Institutions, 65 TEmP. L. REV, 91, 93 (1992).
7 See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir.
1990).
9 See, e.g., id.
10 see, g id. at 354.
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interpretive discretion and have made judicial attempts to apply free
exercise precedent particularly difficult in the historic preservation
context." Accordingly, courts deciding cases involving this free exer-
cise/historic preservation conflict have interpreted Smith to produce
contradictory decisions in what look like very similar cases." The
strictures of Smith require courts considering this conflict to either: 1)
protect only preservation rights by applying the case's neutral holding
to preservation laws and not scrutinizing their effect on free exercise
rights; or 2) protect only free exercise rights by determining preserva-
tion laws fit into one of Smith's exceptions and applying strict scru-
tiny." The former will result in courts upholding the preservation or-
dinance no matter what the factual situation, and the latter will result
in courts always striking down the ordinance regardless of the severity
of its impact." Consequently, with Smith as the controlling free exer-
cise case, no legal framework exists that allows courts to balance free
exercise rights with historic preservation interests to determine the
most equitable outcome in this conflict. 15
Part I of this Note reviews the history of historic preservation in
the United States." This part details the evolution of the preservation
movement from its humble beginnings, to its role as an important
municipal land use tool, to the Supreme Court's ratification of pres-
ervation as a valid use of the police power." Part II introduces the
Free Exercise Clause and traces the Supreme Court's ever-fluctuating
interpretation of that clause's scope." This part discusses the impact
of Smith's revolutionary holding on the Supreme Court's application
of strict scrutiny in previous free exercise cases." Part HI considers
Smith's impact on cases involving the application of historic preserva-
tion ordinances to historic religious properties, and articulates how
ambiguities in Smith left courts too much discretion. 2° Finally, Part IV
analyzes the two general approaches courts apply to the free exer-
" See infra notes 187-271 and accompanying text.
" Compare St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354 (holding that the New York Landmarks
Law is a neutral law of general applicability under Smith), with First Covenant Church v.
City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174,180 (Wash. 1992) (holding that the Seattle Preservation Or-
dinance is neither neutral nor generally applicable under Smith).
15 See infra notes 272-299 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 272-294 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 272-294 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 22-67 and accompanying text.
17 See Wm notes 22-67 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 68-160 and accompanying text.
to See infra notes 111-160 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 161-271 and accompanying text.
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cise/historic preservation conflict and proposes a balancing test as an
alternative and more equitable analysis for resolving the conflict. 21
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE HISTORIC PRESERVATION MOVEMENT
A. Historic Preservation's Humble Beginnings
Private individuals dedicated to preserving individual landmark
buildings mounted the first preservation efforts in the United States. 22
Occasionally; these concerned citizens persuaded state and city gov-
ernments to use public funds to purchase landmark buildings, but the
government had no comprehensive plan for the preservation of im-
portant historic structures. 25 Congress, however, condemned several
Civil War battlefield sites in the 1890s and preserved them as memori-
als. 24 In 1896, in United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., the
United States Supreme Court upheld Congress's purchase of Gettys-
burg as a valid use of eminent domain—the first Supreme Court case
to consider historic preservation issues. 25 Government involvement
was limited, however, and through the turn of the century the preser-
21 See infra notes 272-355 and accompanying text.
22
 Christopher J. Duerksen & David Bonderman, Preservation Law: Where It's Been, Where
Its Going, in HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAIN 1, 1-2 (Christopher J. Duerksen
ed., 1983). Typical of these early preservation efforts was the work of Pamela Sue Cun-
ningham, who, in 1853, chartered the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association to acquire the
deteriorating Mt. Vernon. Id. By appealing to other women with means and patriotic fer-
vor, Cunningham raised enough money to purchase and restore George Washington's
home. Sec id.
23 Id. at 2. In 1816, the City of Philadelphia paid $70,000 to purchase the old state capi-
tol known to Americans today as Independence Hall. Id. The nation at that time was much
more interested in expansion and development than preservation because it was still deal-
ing with creating a stronghold on what was a newly settled continent. See Carol M. Rose,
Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV.
473, 474 (1981). In the nineteenth century, the federal government's preservation efforts
were focused on the natural environment and ancient Native American sites. NORMAN
TYLER, HISTORIC PRESERVATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND
PRACTICE 35 (2000). Congress designated Yellowstone National Park a protected area in
1872, and, in 1889, Congress designated the Casi Grande ruin in Arizona as the nation's
first National Monument. Id. In 1888, Congress established Mesa Verde National Park to
preserve the area's ancient cliff dwellings. Id.
24 TYLER, supra note 23, at 35.
23 160 U.S. 668, 683 (1896). The Court reasoned that the national character and im-
portance of the site mandated efforts to "show a proper recognition of the great things
that were done there on those momentous days." Id. at 682. The justices were not consid-
ering the constitutionality of historic preservation ordinances that regulate the use of the
property of private citizens; rather, the Court ruled on whether preservation was a valid
purpose for which Congress could exert its power of eminent domain. Id. at 680-81.
2003]	 Free Exercise Exemptions to Historic Preservation Ordinances	 209
vation of landmark buildings continued to depend on the ability of
concerned citizens to garner the attention of philanthropists. 26
In 1926, in Village of Euclid u Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court
forever changed the historic preservation framework when it held
that zoning constituted a valid exercise of the police power. 27 Because
they considered zoning and historic preservation to be analogous,
various local groups became emboldened by the case's result and
slowly began regulating entire historic districts in an attempt to pre-
serve neighborhood character and urban identity. 28 In 1954, in Ber-
man a Parke); the Supreme Court upheld government regulation
solely motivated by aesthetic purposes and provided a further boon to
the preservation movement. 29 By the early 1950s, historic preservation
had evolved from private and sporadic attempts to save significant
26 See TYLER, supra note 23, at 37-38. In his attempts to preserve Colonial Williams-
burg, Dr. William Goodwin attracted the attention of John D. Rockefeller by stating, "Wil-
liamsburg is the one remaining colonial village any man could buy." Id. (quoting GEORGE
HUMPHREY METIER, WILLIAMSBURG BEFORE AND AFTER: THE REB1R111 OF VIRGINIA'S CO-
LONIAL CAPITAL 51 (1996)). Williamsburg was saved only because Rockefeller found the
idea of purchasing and restoring an entire colonial village intriguing. See id. Similarly, in
1929, Henry Ford used his wealth to bring an entire community of historic structures to
Dearborn, Michigan, and he rebuilt them at a site named Greenfield Village. Id.
27 272 U.S. 365, 396-97 (1926) (holding that the zoning ordinance passed by the vil-
lage that prevented a realty company from using its property for commercial purposes and
reduced the land value by ninety percent was a valid use of the police power); Daniel T.
Cavarello, From Penn Central to United Artists' I & Tire Rise to Imlrilinity of Historic Amer.
vation Designation Jima Successful Takings Challenges, 22 B.C. ENVTL, MT. L. REV. 593, 599-
600 (1995).
28 See Cavarello, supra note 27, at 599-600. In 1931, Charleston, South Carolina passed
the first historic preservation ordinance providing for design control and architectural
review in the antebellum section of the city, and other cities slowly followed suit. Duerksen
& Bonderman, supm note 22, at 6.
26 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (upholding as a valid exercise of the police power Congress's
exercise of eminent domain over various areas of urban blight in Washington D.C. in an
attempt to redevelop the neighborhoods). Notably, Berman states:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it repre-
sents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within
the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled.... If those who govern the District of Columbia decide
that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is noth-
ing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Id. (citations omitted).
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landmark buildings to a legitimate means of community-building
through rehabilitation of community landmarks. 3°
B. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 and the Subsequent
Growth of the Historic Preservation Movement
During the 1950s and 1960s, federally funded highway and urban
renewal projects fueled the decay of historic city neighborhoods and
the suburbanization of America. 31 The resulting destruction of cele-
brated older buildings, like the original Pennsylvania Station in New
York City, taught the public and government officials the drastic conse-
quences of losing extremely important landmarks to the wrecking
ball.52
 The resulting swell of support for historic' preservation led Con-
gress to pass the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 ("NHPA"), 33
The NHPA brought national attention to the need for historic preser-
vation and set up a comprehensive legal framework to address Amer-
ica's concern for historic buildings. 34
The NHPA has three major components. 35 First, the NHPA created
the National Register of Historic Places, a list compiled by the Secretary
of the Interior that encourages preservation by documenting the
significance of historic structures. 36 Second, the NHPA created the Ad-
" See Rose, supra note 23, at 480. The modern preservation movement stresses the
"sense of place" that older structures lend to a community, giving citizens orientation and
a "sense of familiarity" in their surroundings. See id.
31 See id. at 488. The shattered and abandoned inner-city neighborhoods that resulted
from these projects forced the government to consider and evaluate the changing nature
of America's cities. See id. at 488-89; see also Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 22, at 8-9.
32 See Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 22, at 9 ("Out of the turbulence of building,
tearing down and rebuilding the face of America, more and more Americans have come to
realize that as the future replaces the past, it destroys much of the physical evidence of the
past." (quoting U.S. CONFERENCE or MAYORS, WITH HERITAGE SO RICH, 204 (1966))).
McKim, Mead and White built Pennsylvania Station from 1905 to 1911 and it was the larg-
est building since the pyramids constructed in a continuous operation. LELAND M. Rom,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE 195 (1979).
33 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x (2000) "[T]he preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is
in the public interest so that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational,
economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future generations of
Americans." Id. § 470(b) (4).
34 See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text; see also TYLER, supra note 23, at 44-45.
35
 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x.
38 Id. § 470a(1) (a). Listing on the National Register enables owners of historic proper-
ties to apply for federal grants to aid in the preservation of the property, and it also notifies
the federal government of what areas and structures they must treat sensitively when forg-
ing ahead with government sponsored-projects. See TYLER, supra note 23, at 47. Listing,
however, does not in any way restrict the rights of private property owners in the use of
their land. Id.
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visory Council on Historic Preservation, an independent executive
agency that has the responsibility to review all federal agency action
that affects historic properties listed on the National Register. 37 Finally,
the NHPA established a federal grant program to encourage the crea-
tion of State Historic Preservation Offices ("SHPOs") to administer
state-wide preservation efforts." Although it provided national guid-
ance to the preservation movement, along with federal tax and other
economic incentives, the NHPA delegated the bulk of preservation
work to the states." In turn, enabling statutes passed by state legisla-
tures delegated the actual regulation to local governments. 40
Municipal preservation boards comprise the heart of the preser-
vation movement because state legislatures authorize them to desig-
nate historic landmarks and regulate historic districts.'" These boards
establish procedures for the consideration of landmark nominations
and criteria on which to base landmark status. 42 Typically, once a
preservation board grants landmark status to a property, the owner
must file a petition with the preservation board for permission to
37 16 U.S.0 §§ 470i—j; see also Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Section 106
Regulations Summary (2001), at http://www.achp.gov/106summary.html . The Advisory
Council, in what is known as the Section 106 review process, reviews the impact govern-
ment action will have on historic structures and provides opportunity for interested parties
to comment. Id. Even if the Council finds adverse effects, it cannot mandate the project to
stop; if the project goes forward, the Council works with state officials to minimize the
impact on historic properties. Id. For more information on Section 106 implementing
regulations and court opinions about compliance with Section 106, see ADINA W.
KANEFIELD, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, FEDERAL HISTORIC PRESER-
VATION CASE LAW, 1966-1996: THIRTY YEARS OF TIME NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION
ACT 10-32 (1996).
38 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b)—(c). SHPOs have several roles: 1) to conduct a survey of historic
properties and sites throughout the state; 2) to process nominations to the National Regis-
ter; 3) to administer federal grants to individual projects within the state; and 4) to advise
the regulations of local agencies. TYLER, supra note 23, at 52-53.
39 TYLER, supra note 23, at 52-54.
49 Id. at 54-55.
41 Id. at 66. Preservation commissions grant landmark" status to individual buildings
whereas 'historic district" designation affects all the buildings in a prescribed area. Wein-
stein, supra note 6, at 99.
42 sg, e.g.,	 MUN. CODE ch. 2-120 (1987), available at http://www.cityofchi-
cago.org/Landmarks/pdf/Landmarks_Ordinance.pdf . The Chicago Landmarks Commis-
sion considers various criteria to determine a building's eligibility for landmark status includ-
ing if: 1) it is a critical part of Chicago's heritage; 2) it is the site of a significant event; 3) it is
associated with a significant person; 4) it is considered important architecture; 5) it was de-
signed by an important architect; and 6) it has unique visual features. Id. at § 620.
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make structural alterations or visible changes." In addition, designa-
tion typically requires a property owner to keep the exterior of the
property in good condition."
Preservation ordinances were subject to takings challenges from
the start, but state and federal courts usually upheld government
regulatory actions as valid land use regulation.45
 Many courts rea-
soned that landmark designation was a rational use of the police
power because preservation provided economic benefits to munici-
palities by increasing tourism and property values." As of 1977, how-
ever, the Supreme Court had never explicitly upheld preservation as a
valid use of a municipality's police power; therefore, state and federal
courts were not bound to support preservation interests. 47
C. The Landmark Penn Central Decision: The Supreme Court Upholds
Histozic Preservation as a Valid Use of the Police Power
State and federal courts were bound shortly thereafter because in
1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Supreme
Court conclusively decided the legality of historic preservation ordi-
nances. 48
 The Court upheld New York City's Landmarks Preservation
Law against a challenge by the Penn Central Transportation Company
("Penn Central')." The conflict began when New York City's Land-
marks Preservation Commission denied Penn Central's proposal to
build an office tower atop Grand Central Station, an official New York
City historic landrnark. 5° Penn Central alleged that the denial consti-
43
 See, e.g., id. at § 2.120-740 ("No permit for alteration, construction, reconstruction,
erection, demolition, relocation or other work shall be issued to any applicant ... without
the written approval of the Commission ....").
"See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 25-311 (West, WESTLAW through Lo-
cal Law 47 of 2002 and Chapter 698 of the Laws of New York for 2002) (stating that the
owner of a landmarked building or building in a historic district must "keep in good repair
(1) all of the exterior portions of such improvement and (2) all interior portions thereof,
which if not so maintained, may cause or tend to cause the exterior portions to dete-
riorate, decay or become damaged").
43 See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 105.
" See id.
47 See Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 22, at 13 ("Even though more and more cit-
ies and towns were enacting local preservation ordinances, there were still gnawing doubts
about whether the U.S. Supreme Court would uphold preservation restrictions.").
46 See 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
" Id. at 122.
m Id. at 116-17. The Commission rejected two separate proposals offered by architect
Marcel Breuer for altering Grand Central Station. Id. at 116. The first consisted of a fifty-
five story office tower resting on the roof of the terminal, and the second proposed a fifty-
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tuted a taking of its property without just compensation under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the designation arbitrarily
denied it full use of its property. 5i The Court engaged in what it called
an "ad hoc" factual inquiry, considering the economic impact of the
regulation, the investment-backed expectations of the property owner,
and the character of the government action. 52 After detailed contem-
plation of these factors, the Court concluded that the Landmarks Law
did not interfere with current or expected use of the property, and,
accordingly, did not effect a taking. 53
Penn Central clarified several important unresolved legal issues sur-
rounding the preservation movement. 54 First, the Court observed that
government regulation to preserve the character of a community and
desirable aesthetic features was a valid exercise of the police power."
Justice William Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that the pres-
ervation of historic structures enhanced the quality of life for all citi-
zens." Second, the Court concluded that landmark laws do not consti-
tute discriminatory or spot zoning. 57 Although decisions to landmark
certain property may target particular individual structures, they are
not arbitrary when based on a comprehensive plan." Third, the Court
noted that regulation to promote the general welfare often burdens
some property owners more than others, but, standing alone, unequal
treatment does not effect a taking." Finally, the Court held that a sub-
stantial economic burden caused by a preservation law is constitutional
as long as the property retains reasonable economic value." Therefore,
courts will uphold preservation ordinances even when they restrict land
three story office tower and the destruction of various portions of the station's facade. Id.
at 117.
51 Id. at 119.
52 Id. at 124 (atiiculating the Court's inability to develop a "set formula" when deter-
mining whether the adverse economic effects of government regulation require just
compensation).
33 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. The Court emphasized that the Landmarks Law in no
way interfered with the current use of the terminal and what must have been the owner's
primary expectation of income. Id. at 136. In .addition, the transferred air rights under
New York City's transferable development rights program would allow for the construction
of an office tower on several adjoining properties. Id. at 137.
54 See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
55 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129.
36 Id. at 108.
57 Id. at 132.
" Id.
39 Id. at 133-34.
5° Penn Centra• 438 U.S. at 136 (highlighting that the Landmarks Law left Penn Cen-
tral with a "reasonable return on its investment").
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owners from exerting full control over their property. 6i After Penn Cen-
tral, historic preservation moved into the mainstream and became a
common tool used by city planners to revitalize downtown neighbor-
hoods.62 Adaptive reuse of older buildings, and the resulting increase in
downtown visitors, generates revenue that ensures economic viability to
otherwise struggling cities and towns.°
Religious structures, because of their stature, location, and architec-
tural significance, frequently are subject to landmark designation or are
located in historic districts. 64 The financial burden of landmark status
can be substantial, and many churches find it interferes with their ability
to run charitable or educational programs. 65 Although most challenges
to preservation laws fail under the Penn Central analysis, religious organi-
zations have gained exemptions from preservation laws based on the
Free Exercise Clause. 66 One must consider the unsteady development of
free exercise jurisprudence, however, before exploring whether the Con-
stitudon requires such exemptions for historic religious structures. 67
et Sce id. at 136-38.
62 See TYLER, supra note 23, at 51 ("Preservation also became an important tool of ur-
ban revitalization during this period."); Rose, supra note 23, at 513 (It is only recently that
historic districts have been viewed as potential contributors to urban revitalization.
Whether or not these hopes are well-founded, they are a major force behind the burgeon-
ing numbers of local districts created in the past ten years."); Elizabeth Williamson, City of
Boerne v. Flores and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Delicate Balance Between Religious
Freedom and Historic Preservation, 13 J. LAND USE & EN irn.. L. 107,148-49 (1997). But see
Rose, supra note 23, at 513 (articulating concerns that, just like earlier federally funded
urban renewal projects, the impact of this "revitalization' works to displace low-income
community residents).
° See TYLER, supra note 23, at 51-52; Williamson, supra note 62, at 149-51. See generally
BARBARA BAER CAPITMAN, DECO DELIGHTS: PRESERVING THE BEAUTY AND JOY OF MIAMI
BEACH ARCHITECTURE (1988). The preservation and restoration of numerous art deco
hotels and buildings in the 1980s was the impetus for the economic revitalization of Miami
Beach, Florida—a world-famous tourist destination. Id.
" See Nelson, supra note 5, at 725 (stating that religious properties in particular need
protection because they "serve as historic and architectural focal points in their communi-
ties").
6 See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 93.
66 See id. at 94.
67 See infra notes 68-160 and accompanying text.
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THE EVOLUTION OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE EVER-
CHANGING SCOPE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. The Origins of the Free Exercise Clause and Its Inclusion in
the First Amendment
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof . ."66 The two religion clauses, known
as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, erected the
celebrated "wall of separation" between church and state so important
to religious freedom in the United States. 69 In particular, the Free Ex-
ercise Clause prohibits government action that criminalizes or pro-
scribes the practice or declaration of religious beliefs or that compels
particular religious expression."
Many consider the scholarship of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison to be the impetus behind the First Amendment's explicit
protection of religious freedom." The 150-year-old tradition of free
exercise in the English colonies dramatically affected these two men."
Four English colonies were founded as havens for religious dissenters
and had specific provisions in their charters aimed at creating an at-
mosphere of religious tolerance for all citizens." Along with these
68 U.S. CONST. amend. I,
69 TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIG-
IOUS LIBERTY 124 (1998) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah
Dodge and Others, a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802) (here-
inafterlefferson's Letter] ); 1VERS, supra note 2, at 133.
70 MRS, supra note 2, at 133.
71 See Reynolds V. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-64 (1878) (discussing works by Madi-
son and Jefferson in determining the scope of the Free Exercise Clause); see also Michael
W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Fire Exercise of Religion, 103 Kum
L. REV. 1409, 1449 (1990). But see HALL, supra note 69, at 117 ("This Jeffersonian domi-
nance of First Amendment theory is historically untenable."). Conceding that Jefferson
and Madison played a role in the development of First Amendment theory, Hall argues
that the contributions of Roger Williams and others voicing evangelical dissent contrib-
uted more to the First Amendment than those relying on humanistic or Enlightenment
rationalism. See id.
72 See McConnell, supra note 71, at 1421, 1499.
73 Id. at 1424-25. George Calvert, a Catholic proprietor, founded Maryland as a haven
for Roman Catholics; Roger Williams, a Protestant dissenter kicked out of Massachusetts,
founded Rhode Island for those similarly situated; and William Penn founded Pennsyl-
vania and Delaware as havens for Quakers. Id. All four colonies extended religious free-
dom to groups other than their own. Id. In contrast, Massachusetts and Virginia set tip
state-sponsored churches, Congregationalism and Anglicanism, respectively, and actively
persecuted religious dissidents. Id. at 1423-25.
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early efforts in support of religious freedom, the scholarship of John
Locke and Roger Williams also influenced the beliefs of both Madi-
son and Jefferson. 74
 Taking their cues from these advocates for relig-
ious freedom, both Madison and Jefferson articulated not only that
the opinions of citizens should be beyond the jurisdiction of civil gov-
ernment, but that society as a whole suffered when citizens were
forced to worship at the government's command." Jefferson's con-
ception of the scope of religious freedom, however, was narrower than
Madison's—he felt it should extend only to religious belief and not to
religious conduct." He did not believe that state legislatures were a
threat to religious belief, and, accordingly, he supported religious
freedom only because it was in the best interests of society to allow
people to follow their own convictions. 77
 In contrast, Madison was a
more fervent believer, and his concern for the separation of church
and state evolved from what he perceived were state-imposed threats
to religious practices." Madison acknowledged the inevitable clash
between religious conduct and secular law, and he felt that states
should sustain free exercise rights in all but the most compelling cir-
cumstances."
74
 HALL, supra note 69, at 129-25, 135; McConnell, supra note 71, at 1430-31,1449.
75 See HALL, supra note 69, at 118-19,125,133-35.
76 Id. at 125-28 (discussing Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
that described religious liberty in reference to belief and opinions and not acts and con-
duct); McConnell, supra note 71, at 1451-52 ("Jefferson espoused a strict distinction be-
tween belief, which should be protected from governmental control, and conduct, which
should not."). Jefferson failed to consider that a legislature could regulate in a way that
might harm the individual conscience probably because his own religious beliefs were
grounded in the rationalist philosophies of the Enlightenment, which did not require
observances or actions that government regulation would affect. See HALL, supra note 69,
at 130-31.
77
 In a letter to Madison, Jefferson wrote that "the declaration that religious faith shall
be unpunished, does not give impunity to criminal acts dictated by religious error." HALL,
supra note 69, at 130-31 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison ( July
31, 1788), in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 442-43 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)). Thus,
Jefferson felt any conflict between religious conduct and government prohibitions could
result only from religious error, not religious conviction. See id.
78 See McConnell, supra note 71, at 1452-53. In a letter to William Bradford, Madison
expressed his frustration at the jailing of several men for publishing their religious beliefs.
Id. Madison's convictions contrasted sharply with those of Jefferson, whose writings never
seemed to show compassion towards those who vigorously advocated their faith. See id.; see
also HALL, supra note 69, at 133.
79 See HALL, supra note 69, at 135, Hall argues that Madison's conception of religious
liberty more closely resembled that of Roger Williams than that of Jefferson, because
Madison advocated freedom "for religion," whereas Jefferson advocated freedom "from
religion." Id. Madison, like Williams, believed that religious beliefs and actions required
protection, not simply isolation, from the secular concerns of civil governments. Id. For
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Based substantially on the strongly expressed convictions of these
two political figures, the Framers included explicit provisions that
would guarantee religious freedom and separation of church and state
in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. 88 The language of the First
Amendment, however, does not clearly articulate whether the Framers
intended the scope of the Free Exercise Clause to reflect Jefferson's ac-
tion/belief dichotomy or Madison's concept of religious protection be-
ing paramount to all but the most compelling state interests. 81
B. Early Free Exercise Jurisprudence: From the Rational Basis Test to the
Compelling Interest Test
Initially, as drafter of the Bill of Rights and as its chief advocate in
Congress, Madison's beliefs infused the popular understanding of the
Free Exercise Clause. 82 In 1878, in Reynolds v. United States, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court explicitly used Jefferson's action/belief dichotomy
to define the Clause's scope. 89 The Reynolds court considered a constitu-
tional challenge by George Reynolds, a Mormon convicted under a law
prohibiting polygarny. 84 The Court, relying on the writings of Jefferson,
concluded that, although Congress could not regulate religious belief,
it could regulate any conduct in violation of "social duties or subversive
of good order."8s Therefore, Reynolds's conviction would stand because
the law against polygamy was not impairing his religious beliefs. 88 The
further discussion of this ideological schism, which has continued into the present day, see
generally Ira C. Lupu, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in. Our Constitutional Order,
VILL. L. REv. 37, 51-78 (2002) (discussing the Neutralist and Separationist views of the
religion clauses and how subscribers of each ideology perceive certain Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause cases and issues).
8° See McConnell, supra note 71, at 1449, 1455.
81 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
82
 McConnell, supra note 71, at 1455.
82 98 U.S. at 164 (quoting excerpts from Jefferson's Letter, supra note 69, stating:
"Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure, it may
be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amend-
ment thus secured.").
54 Id. at 161-62.
°s Id. at 164.
86 Sec id. at 166. The Court introduced a parade of horribles to support its decision,
implying that if the Court could not enforce the polygamy law, it in turn would not be able
to prevent human sacrifice if done with a religious motive. See id. A Mormon exemption
for polygamy, concluded the Court, would elevate religious conduct to a status above the
law, and "permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." Id. at 167. For more informa-
tion about the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, see generally MORMONS AND
MORMONISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO AN AMERICAN WORLD RELIGION (Eric A. Elinson ed.
2001).
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Court upheld the application of the criminal statute because the gov-
ernment had shown a rational basis for criminalizing polygamy.° Mov-
ing forward, the Court's rational basis standard hindered its ability to
grant exemptions to criminal laws for religious conduct because the
government needed only to provide a rational basis to legally impinge
upon the religious conduct in question."
Reynolds remained the most important free exercise case decided
during the Clause's first 150 years." In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
the U.S. Supreme Court extended the protections of the Free Exer-
cise Clause to state action in its second major free exercise decision."
With the increase in regulation following the New Deal, and the in-
clusion of state laws within the scope of the First Amendment, the
Court saw an increase in cases involving clashes between secular laws
and religious conduct. 91 The Court continued to rely more or less on
the rational basis analysis articulated in Reynolds when considering
free exercise claims.92 Therefore Jefferson's idea, that religious con-
duct could be burdened incidentally by state action as long as beliefs
remained free from government influence, dominated free exercise
analysis up through the 1950s. 99
87 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165 ("From that day to this we think it may safely be said there
never has been a time in any State of the Union when polygamy, has not been an offence
against society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less severity.").
88 See id. at 166.
89 Terry Eastland, Introduction to RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT'. THE
CASES THAT DEFINE THE DEBATE OVER CHURCH AND STATE 1, 1 (Terry Eastland ed., 1993).
9° 310 U.S. 296, 303, 307 (1940) (holding that the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness un-
der a Connecticut statute forbidding unlicensed solicitation of funds was a burden on his free
exercise of religion). The Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause incorporated the protections of the Free Exercise Clause and made them applicable
to the states. Id. For more information about Jehovah's Witnesses, see generally ANDREW
HOLDEN, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: PORTRAIT OF A CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT
(2002).
St See Eastland, supra note 89, at 1 (articulating that the limited role the federal gov-
ernment played in the lives of American citizens provided few opportunities for federal
action to burden religious conduct).
92 Sec, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04 (1961) (upholding mandatory
Sunday closing laws against a challenge by Orthodox Jewish shopkeepers whose Sabbath
was Saturday because the closing laws served a secular government purpose). For more
information about Orthodox Judaism, see generally MURRAY HERBERT DANZGER, RETURN-
ING TO TRADFIlON: THE CONTEMPORARY REVIVAL OF ORTHODOX JUDAISM (1989).
93 See Eastland, supra note 89, at 6 ("The rational-basis test, which in most cases gov-
ernment can easily satisfy, virtually closed the door to constitutionally compelled exemp-
tions that might be carved out by federal courts—until 1963, that is, when in Sherbert v.
Verner the Court changed its mind.").
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Madison's concern for protecting religious conduct, however, did
not remain dormant.94 In 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner; the U.S. Supreme
Court radically changed the course of free exercise jurisprudence
when it required the state to show a compelling interest in any state
action that burdened the free exercise of religion. 95 The Court con-
cluded it would apply strict scrutiny to any law or decision that inci-
dentally burdened religious conduct even when religious beliefs were
unaffected." The Court, therefore, had shifted its conception of the
scope of free exercise rights from Jefferson's action/belief dichotomy
to Madison's support of religious conduct in all but the most compel-
ling circumstances.97 Sherbert involved Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-day
Adventist fired by her employer because she refused to work on Sat-
urday, her Sabbath celebration." South Carolina had found her ineli-
gible for unemployment benefits because, by refusing to work on Sat-
urday, she had refused to accept both suitable and available work. 99
The Court concluded that only a compelling state interest could
justify the burden on religion imposed on Sherbert by the state, and
the decision to deny her unemployment was therefore subjected to
strict scrutiny.'" Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, asserted that
South Carolina's ruling essentially fined Sherbert for her Saturday wor-
ship; thus, the state's denial of benefits was tantamount to economically
coercing Sherbert's religious beliefs.im The Court concluded that con-
ditioning benefits on particular behavior infringed upon the Sherbert's
freedom of religion because it required her to choose between abiding
by the tenets of her faith and maintaining her livelihood)" In addition,
because an exemption for Sherbert alone would not detrimentally af-
fect the entire unemployment statutory scheme, the state had no corn-
91 See id.; see also infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
95 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
" See id. at 403, 406.
97 See id. at 406; Eastland, supra note 89, at 6.
9.8 374 U.S, at 399. The prohibition against Saturday labor is a basic tenet of the Sev-
enth-day Adventist Church. Id. at 402. For more information about the Seventh-day Ad-
ventist Church, see generally ANNE DEVEREAUX JORDAN, THE SEVENTII-DAY ADVENTISTS: A
His-tottv (1988).
as Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401. The South Carolina unemployment law provided that any
claimant who failed, without good cause, to take work offered or available to him or her
was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Id. at 400-01.
Too See id. at 406-07.
tut See id. at 404, 440.
'° Id. at 404, 406.
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gelling interest in denying her unemployment benefits.i"S Accordingly,
the state's decision failed the Court's strict scrutiny analysis and Sher-
bert's benefits were reinstated.'"
Similarly, in 1972, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the U.S. Supreme Court
again required an exemption from a neutral and generally applicable
law to accommodate religious conduct. 105 In Yoder, Amish parents
were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance
law because they refused to send their children to school after the
eighth grade."6 Relying on Sherbert, the Court subjected Wisconsin's
compulsory school attendance law to strict scrutiny. 07 The Court
noted that, because of the unique tenets of the Amish faith, compul-
sory high school attendance threatened to undermine an Amish
child's unique religious development.'" The Court concluded that
the State's interest in providing universal education was not compel-
ling because, when removed from school, the Yoders still planned to
educate their children in a "learning-through-doing" vocational pro-
gram.m Therefore, the State's very strong interest in education was
not sufficient to overcome the law's incidental burden on the Amish
faith, and the Yoder Court exempted the Amish from the law.H°
1°]
 Id. at 408-09. The Court distinguished Braunfeld, the case in which it upheld man-
datory Sunday closing laws against a challenge by Orthodox Jews, by reasoning that, in
Braunfeld, the state did have a strong interest in providing a day of rest for all citizens. Id.
In contrast to Sherbert, in which the Court concluded that an exemption would not alter
the unemployment statutory scheme, the Court in Braunfeld felt that exemptions for Jews
would disrupt the state's objective. Id.
1" See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409-10.
100
 406 U.S. 205,234-35 (1972).
100 Id. at 208. The Court noted the pervasive way in which Amish religion infuses the
practices of daily life. Id. at 210. For more information on the Amish faith, see generally
DONALD B. KRAYBILL, ON THE BACK ROAD To HEAVEN: OLD ORDER HUTTERITES, MENNON-
ITES, AMISH, AND BRE'FIIREN (2001).
107 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15.
laa Id. at 211-12. The Court noted that the values taught at American high schools
("intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly
success and social life") are regarded by the Amish to be worldly influences at odds with
their religious beliefs. Id. The Amish faith celebrates "informal learning-through.doing; a
life of 'goodness' rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge;
community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than integration
with, contemporary worldly society." Id.
1 " Id. at 213,224-25.
110 See id. at 234.
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C. The Smith Revolution and the Death of Strict Scrutiny
Until 1990, commonly it was understood that any free exercise
claim resulting from an incidental or direct burden imposed by a neu-
tral, generally applicable law would subject that law to strict scrutiny."
In Sherbert and Yodel; after the challenging parties showed that the chal-
lenged law infringed on free exercise rights, the burden shifted to the
state to show the law had a secular purpose, advanced a compelling
state interest, and constituted the only feasible means for achieving the
state's purpose. 112 The Court's application of strict scrutiny made it vir-
tually impossible for the government to sustain its burden, and as a re-
sult, it almost always struck down the challenged laws. 113
In 1990, however, in Employment Division v. Smith, the U.S. Su-
preme Court did not apply strict scrutiny to a contested Oregon law
that allegedly violated the Free Exercise Clause. 114 Smith involved two
Native Americans. whose bosses fired them when they were convicted
for peyote use under an Oregon drug law, and to whom the state de-
nied unemployment benefits. 113 Because the claimants ingested pe-
yote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American
church, they alleged the denial of benefits burdened their free exer-
cise of religion. 116 The claimants relied on what they perceived to be
Sherbert's holding—that when religious conduct resulted in a loss of
employment, a state's refusal to provide unemployment benefits was a
free exercise violation. 117 The Court rejected the claimants' position
and concluded that in past cases, including Sherbert, it had never held
that a religious burden exempted citizens from an otherwise valid and
generally applidble law like the Oregon drug lawns
By not requiring Oregon to show a compelling state interest in its
peyote ban ; the Court revolutionized free exercise jurisprudence. 119
Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia stated that 'the right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
111 Carmella, supra note 5, at 420.
112 See id.
113 See supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
"4 494 U.S. 872,884-85 (1990).
115 Id. at 874.
116 See id.. at 878. For more information on the Native American Church, see generally
ONE NATION UNDER COD: THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH (Huston
Smith & Ruben Snake eds., 1996) and JAMES SYDNEY SLOTKIN, THE PEYOTE Rutoion: A
STUDY IN INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS (Octagon Books 1975) (1956).
117 Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
119 See id. at 878-79.
119 See Eastland, supra note 89, at 6-7.
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comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his relig-
ion prescribes (or proscribes)." 12° In other words, the Court con-
cluded that as long as the state did not intend to burden religious
conduct, the Court would uphold the state's interest against any free
exercise challenge. 121
 The Court concluded that the challenged pe-
yote law was neutral and generally applicable; hence, it burdened only
the conduct of the adherents and not their religious beliefs. 132
 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the law did not violate the Free Exer-
cise Clause because the burden it imposed on religion was incidental
and not intentional. 123
Essentially, Smith rejected the paramount protection for religious
acts advocated by Madison and instead embraced Jefferson's support
for government action that did not directly burden or coerce relig-
ious beliefs but significantly interfered only with religious conduct. 124
Relying on Reynolds, in which the Court upheld Jefferson's ac-
tion/belief dichotomy, the Court stated that conditioning a person's
responsibility to follow general laws on his religious beliefs effectively
made each citizen a law unto hirnself."126 The diverse range of relig-
ious beliefs in America, Justice Scalia argued, would require exemp-
tions from a staggering array of laws—including vaccination laws,
drug laws, and animal cruelty laws—that would frustrate the impor-
tant objectives of those laws.' 26
 Members of a particular religious
group may desire exemptions to allow for conduct otherwise pro-
scribed by law, but the Court concluded it was not constitutionally re-
quired to grant them. 127
 Various state legislatures had made excep-
125 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)).
121 See id. at 878. Justice Scalia articulated that if the legislature did not intend to bur-
den religion—such as by passing a law prohibiting the casting of statues used for worship—
but the law merely had that incidental effect, then the law did not violate the First
Amendment. Id.
122 See id. at 877-78.
t22 Id. at 878-80.
124 See id.
/25 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167). To Justice Scalia, the idea
that citizens could pick and choose the laws they would follow based on their religious
beliefs contradicted "both constitutional tradition and common sense." Id.
125 Id. at 889. In her concurrence, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor contended that Jus-
tice Scalia's parade of horribles was not reason enough to strike down the compelling in-
terest test; rather, the cases he referenced showed how the Court, in many cases, had sen-
sibly struck an appropriate balance between government interests and religious conduct
with application of the compelling interest test. See id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 890.
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tions for peyote use in their drug laws before Smith was decided, and
the Court concluded that the political process remained the most
suitable place for such determinations. 128
Although the Court rejected the application of strict scrutiny to
most free exercise claims, Justice Scalia carved two exceptions from
Smith's basic holding to account for seemingly contrary precedent) 29
First, the Court distinguished past religious exemptions on the grounds
that the challenged laws implicated the Free Exercise Clause in con-
junction with other constitutional protections)" Therefore, when
other constitutional violations were alleged in conjunction with a free
exercise violation, such as the rights of parents to direct their children's
education seen in Yoder, the Court would apply strict scrutiny and re-
quire the state show a compelling interest in the contested law."' The
Court concluded that no hybrid rights were implicated when the state
denied the Smith claimants unemployment benefits; hence, the inci-
dental effects of the otherwise neutral law did not offend the claimants'
First Amendment rights. 192
Second, the Court concluded that Sherbert's compelling interest
test also applied to laws that had a state-imposed system of individual-
ized exemptions)" Justice Scalia highlighted that in Sherbert, South
Carolina had the discretion to grant exemptions to unemployment
eligibility because the "good cause" language in the statute invited
consideration of the particular circumstances behind a claimant's un-
employment)" The Court noted it had required that refusals in cases
of religious hardship be subjected to strict scrutiny supported by a
compelling government interest because individual considerations by
government actors provided easy means to discriminate)" Because
the peyote ban applied to all Oregon citizens and had no system of
125 Id.
1" See infra notes 130-136 and accompanying text.
13° Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
' 31 Id. For example, in 1925, in Prince v. Society of the Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered whether an Oregon law requiring all children to attend public schools was
constitutional. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). It held that the law violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because it "unreasonably interfere(d) with the liberty of parents and guardi-
ans to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." Id.
I" 494 U.S. at 882. Hereinafter, this first exception to Smith's holding will be called the
"hybrid rights" exception.
1!!
	 at 884. Hereinafter, this second exception to Smith's holding will be called the
"individualized exemption" exception.
134 Id.
1 " mid.
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individualized exemptions, the Smith Court distinguished Sherbert and
refused to apply strict scrutiny.'"
In 1993, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. u City of Hialeah,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Smith and, in striking down four city
ordinances, attempted to clarify its controversial ruling.'" The Hialeah
Court considered the validity of ordinances. the Hialeah city council
passed to prohibit various types of animal sacrifice.'" The newly
formed Santeria community sued, arguing that the ordinances collec-
tively burdened their free exercise rights by forbidding their most im-
portant ritualistic element—animal sacrifice.'" The trial court held
that the ordinances were a valid use of the police power because the
City grounded its prohibition of animal sacrifice in public safety, animal
cruelty, and sanitation concerns."°
The Court concluded that the Hialeah ordinances were facially
neutral; but that facial neutrality alone did not make a law neutral and
generally applicable under Smith.' {1
 The Court determined that the
City "gerrymandered" the ordinances to proscribe only the religious
sacrifices of the Santeria church, and not Kosher slaughter or other
animal killings."2
 The laws directly targeted the Santeria faith because
other regulations could have met the same ends without prohibiting
animal sacrifice rituals, revealing the council's intent to end only Sante-
rian practices."2
 The Court also determined that the ordinances did
136 Id.
I" See Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,531 (1993).
138 Id. at 526. The Santeria religion is a fusion of the traditional African religion of the
Yoruba people with Roman Catholicism. Id. It originated in the nineteenth century when
colonists brought Ibrtiba tribe members to Cuba as slaves. 'Id. at 524. The religion involves
the worship and development of a personal relationship with the Orisha, a sacred spirit,
through animal sacrifice. Id. at 525. Adherents of Santeria believe that for nourishment
purposes the Orisha needs the chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep,
and turtles that San teria followers sacrifice. Id. For more information on the Santeria faith,
See generally MICHAEL ATWOOD MASON, LIVING SANTERIA: RITUALS AND EXPERIENCES IN
AN AFRO-CUBAN RELIGION (2002) and MARTA MORENO VEGA, THE ALTAR OF MY SOUL:
THE LIVING TRADITIONS OF SANTER1A (2000).
1 " Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 528.
140
 Id. at 529-30.
141 Id. at 533-34.
142 Id. at 535-36,542. The ordinances proscribe Santerian animal killings because they
meet the two criteria articulated for unlawful slaughter: 1) they are done within the con-
text of a ritual or ceremony and 2) their primary objective is not food consumption. See id.
143 Id. at 538. The Court reasoned that, if sanitation was the aim of the ordinance, a
constitutional regulation would provide rules for the disposal of organic garbage. Id.
Moreover, if the City aimed to prevent animal cruelty with the ordinances, then it should
have promulgated more specific regulations about how animals must be kept and the hu-
mane ways in which they could be slaughtered. Id. at 539. The animosity of members of
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not fall within Smith because they were not generally applicable.'" By,
in effect, prohibiting only Santerian sacrifices, the Court found the laws
substantially underinclusive and certainly distinguishable from the
across-the-board criminal prohibition in Smith. 145 The Court noted that
the ordinances aimed to protect public health and prevent animal cru-
e1ty. 146 Although the City should have distributed the responsibility to
meet those aims evenly throughout the populace, the Hialeah ordi-
nances imposed the burden only upon religious practices and not vari-
ous secular killings. 147 Therefore, the ordinances were not generally
applicable because they only applied to animal sacrifice performed in a
religious context. 148
Because the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally appli-
cable under Smith, the Court subjected Hialeah's laws to Sherbert's strict
scrutiny analysis. 149 Justice Anthony Kennedy quickly dismissed the
City's defense because the religious "gerrymandering" that he had pre-
viously noted proved that the City left unregulated most of the conduct
that implicated its stated aims.'" He concluded that the City's interest
in those aims was far from compelling because the council failed to
create means that met its articulated ends.'" In addition, the ordi-
nances were too underinclusive to meet the narrowly tailored standard
precedent required. 162
Despite the protections the Court's application of Smith provided
to the Santeria adherents in Hialeah, legal scholars routinely criticized
Smith for narrowing the scope of the Free Exercise Clause and ignoring
thirty years of legal precedent that gave religious interests much
broader protection.'" Opponents of the decision also lamented that
the community and the city council toward the Santeria faith and its adherents bolstered
the Court's finding that the law was not substantively neutral. Id. at 540141.
144 Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 543-44.
145 See id. at 543.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 544.
148 Id.
149 Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546 ("A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or
not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.").
155 See id.
16'
	
at 546-47. The Court again highlighted that only religious conduct felt the
brunt of these ordinances and therefore the asserted justifications did not justify the bur-
den on religion. Id.
152 Id.
155 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court
Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 260 ("Like many others I believe Employment Division v.
Smith is substantively wrong and institutionally irresponsible."); Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cut. L. Rev. 1109, 1120 (1990) (con-
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Smith inadequately protected the free exercise rights of religious mi-
norities whose practices more often conflict with neutral laws. 184
 In ad-
dition, scholars criticized Smith because it left the state of free exercise
jurisprudence in chaos. 155
 In response to this popular outcry, in 1993,
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and
restored Sherbert's strict scrutiny as the legal analysis applicable to free
exercise claims, 158
 RFRA's reign was short lived because, in 1997, in City
of Boerne u Flores, the U.S. Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitu-
tiona1, 157
 In 2000, in response to Boerne, Congress passed the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). 158 RLUIPA
requires the government to show a compelling interest in any land use
regulation that "substantially burdens" religion, effectively reinstating
Sherbert as the controlling legal analysis. 159
 Because the constitutional
chiding that the Court's use of precedent is "troubling, bordering on the shocking"); see
also Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Smith holding
"dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears unneces-
sary to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible with our Nation's fundamental
commitment to individual religious liberty").
'54
 Roald Mykkeltvedt, Employment Division v. Smith: Creating Anxiety fry Relieving Ten-
sion, 58 TENN. L. Rev. 603, 608 (1991) ("As a negative consequence of that ruling ... the
Court will have exposed minority religions to a potential 'tyranny of the majority.'"); see
also Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the politi-
cal process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in . . ..").
155
 First, the Court failed to define with particularity what constituted a neutral and
generally applicable law. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Freedom and International Hu-
man Rights in the United States Today, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 951, 967 (1998) ("The great
ambiguity is that no one knows what is a neutral and general applicable law."). Second, its
brief consideration of the hybrid rights and individualized exemption exceptions to Smith's
general rule provided little guidance to lower courts. See infra notes 222-271 and accom-
panying text.
158 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (2000). In its declaration of purpose, Congress ex-
pressly rejected Smith's narrowing of free exercise protection and lent its support to the
logic of both Sherbert and Yoder: Id. § 2000bb-(a) (4), (b) (1). With RFRA, Congress created a
new statutory free exercise right that applied to federal and state law as well as any deci-
sion made by any agency, branch, or official of the federal or any state government. See id.
§ 2000bb-2.
1" 521 U.S. 507, 536 (2000) ("RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies,
such as the one before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are
beyond congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must con-
trol."). In Boerne, St. Peter's Catholic Church alleged that the City's denial of a demolition
permit for its historic church building violated RFRA. Id. at 512. Unfortunately, because
the law was found to be an unconstitutional use of Congress's powers under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, none of the issues pertinent to this Note were decided by the
Court. Id. at 529-33.
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
158 See id. The relevant language of the statute states:
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status of the law is uncertain, few courts have decided RLUIPA claims
on the merits and the few post-RLUIPA courts that have considered the
conflict often have applied the more familiar Smith analysis. 16°
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner
that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, in-
cluding a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demon-
strates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (B) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.
Id.
16° See, e.g., Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574-76
(2d Cir. 2002) (upholding preliminary injunction under Free Exercise Clause analysis,
allowing homeless individuals to sleep on church property). The challenges to RLUIPA are
similar to those that litigants brought against RFRA: that in enacting the law, Congress
exceeded its powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Boene, 521
U.S. at 536. The constitutionality of RLUIPA.is
 beyond the scope of this Note. If the U.S.
Stipreme Court determines that RLUIPA is constitutional, however, as the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania did in Freedom Baptist Church u Township of
Middletown, the analysis of the free exercise/historic preservation conflict under RLUIPA
does not really differ from that under Smith. See 204 F. Stipp. 2d 857, 874 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
Because the underlying assumption of § 2000cc(a) (2) (C) is that preservation ordinances
have in place a system of individualized exemptions, the analysis pertinent to this Note is
still applicable. See § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). Therefore, a court considering a claim under
RLUIPA would agree with a court that concluded that preservations ordinances fit under
Smith's individualized exemption exception. See Hale 0 Katila Church v. Maui Planning
Comm'n, 229 F. Stipp. 2d 1056, 1072-74 (D. Haw. 2002) (concluding that consideration of
RLUIPA's constitutionality was moot and strict scrutiny would apply under Smith because
the law had in place a system of individualized exemptions); Alan C. Weinstein, Religious
Land Use and RLUIPA Update, in LAND USE INSTMTE: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGA-
TION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION 69 (A.L.I,-A.B.A. COURSE or S•runv, Aug.
22-24, 2002), WL SH018 ALI-ABA 69 (articulating that the application of RLUIPA would
result in courts applying the compelling interest test from 'Pre-Smith- cases). If a court
determines that RLUIPA is unconstitutional, or the burden imposed by the preservation
ordinance is not "substantial," then it will also revert to the Smith analysis. See, e.g., Elsinore
Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Stipp. 2d 1163, 1176-77 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(holding RLUIPA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power, and supporting
Smith's application of the Sherbert compelling interest test only in the unemployment con-
text); San Jose Christian Coil. v. City of Morgan Hill, 2002 WL 971779, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2002) (holding that RLUIPA did not apply and relying on Smith to deny plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction against application of a municipal zoning ordinance).
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Ill THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH'S AMBIGUITIES
ON COURTS CONSIDERING FREE EXERCISE CHALLENGES
TO HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAWS
A. An Introduction to the Free Exercise/Historic Preservation Conflict
Preservation ordinances impose financial costs for upkeep and
restoration that may drain funds from a religious group's charitable,
educatiOnal, or religious missions. 161 Conseqtiently, many congrega-
tions find that design control threatens their religious autonomy and
burdens their free exercise of religion. 162 As discussed above, the na-
tion's utmost concern for free exercise of religion resulted in its pro-
tection by the First Amendment—protection that runs to the present
day. 163 Historic preservation, however, remains an important govern-
ment interest and a tool used to maintain the character and economic
integrity of urban spaces. 164 The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged and upheld the government's interest in preserving its built
heritage, and the successes of the preservation movement are well
documented. 165
Since the U.S. Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Divi-
sion u Smith, courts have ruled inconsistently on the impact of free
exercise jurisprudence on the application of preservation ordinances
to historic religious structures. 166
 This judicial inconsistency is a result
of Smith's lack of clarity in articulating what constitutes a neutral law
of general applicability and what triggers the hybrid rights or indi-
vidualized exemption exceptions. 167 Without regard to the facts of a
case, the strictures of Smith require courts to choose one of two alter-
natives: 1) follow Smith and conclude that incidental burdens imposed
by preservation ordinances on the free exercise of religion are per-
167 See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 93.
'62 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir.
1990); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 177-78 (Wash. 1992).
163 See supra notes 68-160 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 31-67 and accompanying text; see also TYLER, supra note 23, at 168-
71 (recognizing that preservation allows communities to preserve important historic struc-
tures, protect against unwanted development, and promote economic stability and the
image of the community).
166 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978); see, e.g., TY-
LER, supra note 23, at 60-66.
166 Compare St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354 (concluding that application of the New
York City Landmarks Law to the Church did not violate the Church's First Amendment
rights), with First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 185 (concluding that the Seattle preservation ordi-
nance violated the Church's free exercise of religion tinder the First Amendment).
167 See infra notes 187-271 and accompanying text.
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missible; or 2) determine that preservation ordinances fit into a Smith
exception and thereby require an exemption for all religious struc-
tures. 168 These alternatives are familiar because courts still waver be-
tween the conflicting views of Jefferson and Madison as to the true
scope of the Free Exercise Clause. 1 °9
B. Free Exercise and Historic Preservation Conflicts Decided Before Smith
Under the Sherbert v. Verner Compelling Interest Analysis
Before considering how courts decide free exercise and historic
preservation conflicts under Smith, first it is important to consider
how courts struck a balance between these two interests before the
Smith revolution. 170 In the 1970s and 1980s, Sherbert v. Verner's strict
scrutiny dominated the analysis, and courts typically gave preferential
treatment to religious denominations that brought lawsuits contesting
the application of zoning ordinances to. their worship spaces."' Few
preservation cases were decided, but zoning ordinances that inciden-
tally burdened religion failed strict scrutiny because, by failing to
maintain community health or safety, they did not serve a compelling
government interest. 172 Hence, under Sherbert, courts mandated ex-
emptions to zoning and preservation ordinances for historic religious
properties in almost all cases.'"
Several courts deciding zoning cases that involved this clash of
interests, however, interpreted the mandates of Sherbert less strictly. 174
For example, in 1983, in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the prohibition of
religious services in a rabbi's home, which was located in an R-4 resi-
168 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354-55; First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 182-83.
169 See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
170 Sec infra notes 171-186 and accompanying text.
171 Sec 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (requiring that the law in question relate to "public
safety, peace, and order" to be a compelling interest sufficient enough to justify burdening
the free exercise of religion); Williamson, supra note 62, at 119.
"2 See Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and Why They Are
Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. Rev. 415, 429 (1999) (concluding that, because preservation ordi-
nances reflect only aesthetic interests, they categorically cannot justify substantial restric-
tions on religious freedom in the name of public safety).
173 See Williamson, supra note 62, at 119 (discussing the more factually based analysis
some courts performed, considering the clash between zoning and free exercise interests
before Smith, but concluding that most courts gave deference to free exercise interests
unless the government presented a compelling interest).
174 See, e.g., Congregation Beth Yitzchok v. Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655, 660 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (holding that local occupancy and fire safety regulations did not burden a syna-
gogue's free exercise of religion).
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dential-only district. 175
 He alleged that the city's ban on religious serv-
ices in the R-4 district was a free exercise burden, so the court per-
formed an ad hoc balancing of the two parties' interests. 176 The court
did not apply strict scrutiny despite citing both Sherbert and Wisconsin
v. Yoder. 177
 Instead, it concluded that the rabbi's ability to walk only a
few blocks to hold services swung the balance in the government's
favor, even when the zoning ordinance did not serve a compelling
government interest.'" Therefore, the court upheld the city's interest
in maintaining its residential-only zone because of the relative in-
significance of the rabbi's free exercise burden. 176
Similarly, in 1981, in Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City
of Lakewood, the Colorado Supreme Court balanced the. interests of
the Church with those of the City before deciding whether the gov-
ernment action was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 1811 The City
had conditioned the granting of building permits on the Church's
willingness to undertake various public improvements for the sur-
rounding streets and sidewalks. 181
 The court concluded that the bur-
den on the Church was minor considering the project's scope and the
City's "substantial interest" in creating a safe flow of traffic around the
Church's property. 182
 Therefore, conditioning the permits was well
within the scope of the City's police power and did not unconstitu-
tionally burden the Church's free exercise of religion. 153
The Eleventh Circuit's balancing in Grosz and the articulation of
a substantial interest test in Bethlehem Evangelical did not represent
1 m 721 F.2d 729, 741 (11th Cir. 1983),
176 Id. at 738-41 ("[A]n ad hoc balancing is appropriate when existing, broad principles
do not command the result.").
177 Id.
178 See id. at 739. The balance weighed in favor of the City because the ordinance did
not require the rabbi to stop practicing his religion under threat of criminal prosecution.
Id. Rather, he simply had to establish his synagogue four blocks away, a minimal inconven-
ience compared to the burdens imposed in Sherbert and Yoder. See id.
179 See id. at 741.
1 °D See 626 P.2d 668, 674-75 (Colo. 1981). The Church wanted to enlarge its parish
school by building a gymnasium and applied to the Department of Community Services of
Lakewood for a permit. Id. at 669.
' 8' Id. at 670. The Department conditioned the issuance of the permit on the Church's
making street improvements around the property and dedicating a small parcel of land to
the City of Lakewood as a public right of way. Id.
1877
	 id. at 675 (citing Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 509 P.2d 1250,
1253 (Colo. 1973)).
itis See id.
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adequately the state of free exercise jurisprudence before Smith. 184
The cases did show, however, that courts have the ability to consider
sensibly the implications for both parties when deciding whether the
government or religious interest should prevail.' Though both cases.
involved zoning ordinances, courts typically treat historic preservation
interests analogously.186
C. The Effect of Smith 's Neutral and Generally Applicable Requirement on,
the Free Exercise/Histori.c Preservation Conflict
Smith created an entirely new legal framework within which
courts must consider the collision between historic preservation in-
terests and free exercise rights.' 87 The Smith decision initially seemed
to favor historic preservation interests because common sense dic-
tated that preservation ordinances were facially neutral laws of gen-
eral applicability.I 88 Accordingly, under Smith, no exemptions would
be granted when ordinances incidentally burdened the free exercise
of religion. 189 For example, in 1990, in St. Bartholomew's Church v. City
of New York, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law against a free
exercise challenge by a midtown Episcopal church. 19° In 1967, pursu-
ant to the Landmarks Law, New York City's Landmarks Preservation
Commission had designated St. Bartholomew's Church and Commu-
nity House historic landmarks. 191 Some fifteen years later, the church
filed a petition with the Commission to replace the Community
184 See Williamson, supra note 62, at 118-19 ("[A] s a whole, courts gave deference to
free exercise interests unless presented with a compelling government interest.").
189 See Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739-40; Bethlehem Evangelical, 626 P.2d at 675.
188 See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132 (rejecting all attempts by the property owner
to distinguish preservation laws from zoning laws and finding the laws constitutional be-
cause of their similarity to zoning ordinances).
187 Sec infra notes 188-271 and accompanying text.
188 See 494 U.S. at 879; Nelson, supra note 5, at 734 (distinguishing preservation laws from
the ordinances in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah that directly sup-
pressed religious conduct); Williamson, supra note 62, at 123 ("[T] he facial application of the
Smith doctrine would seem to place a pro-preservation slant on religious-preservation
conflicts ....").
189 494 U.S. at 878-79; see supra notes 111-136 and accompanying text.
lrx} 914 F.2d at 355.
191 Id. at 351. The church was constructed in 1917 by Bertram G. Goodhue and is a no-
table example of the Venetian Byzantine style. Id. Goodhue incorporated the porch of the
original Romanesque St. Bartholomew's Church built by McKim, Mead and White, the
notable architects of famous buildings like the Boston Public Library and the former
Pennsylvania Station in New York. Id. The Community House was built in 1928 by Good-
hue's associates, and complements the church in scale, style and decoration. Id.
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House with a fifty-nine story office tower. 192 The Commission denied
that petition and two others that followed, and the Church brought
suit alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.'"
The Second Circuit relied heavily on Smith in affirming the dis-
trict court's decision)" The circuit court concluded that the Land-
marks Law was facially neutral within the meaning of Smith, and thus,
the incidental burden on religion it imposed did not violate the
Church's free exercise rights. 05 The Church argued that, because
over fifteen percent of the regulated buildings in New York were relig-
ious, the Landmarks Law was neither neutral nor generally applica-
ble,'" The Second Circuit reasoned, however, that such a high num-
ber reflected only that religious structures, more often than secular,
fall into the neutral criteria the board developed. 197 In addition, the
court found the law generally applicable because the Commission did
not intend to discriminate against religion when it chose which build-
ings to landmark. 198 Many state courts followed St. Bartholomew's and
held that preservation ordinances were neutral and generally appli-
cable for Smith purposes. 199
Courts looking to escape from the strictures of Smith, which many
legal scholars believed was wrongly decided, held that preservation
ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. 200 If a law
was not neutral or generally applicable, the Smith court had con-
cluded it would apply strict scrutiny and require the law to further a
192 Id.
193 Id. at 352.
I% Id. at 354-55.
190 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354-55,
196 Id. The church stated that, of the 600 landmarked sites in New York City in 1990,
over fifteen percent were religious properties and over five percent were Episcopal
churches. Id. The Second Circuit concluded that churches more often fit into the neutral
criteria because of the "importance. of religion, and of particular churches, in our social
and cultural history, and because many churches are designed to be architecturally attrac-
tive." Id.
197 Id.
lga Id. at 354.
199 See, e.g., First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Ridgefield Historic Dist. Comm'n, 738
A.2d 224,231 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) ("The commission's decision has not interfered
with the right of the plaintiffs or its members to express their religious views, or associate
or assemble for that purpose."), affd, 737 A.2d 989 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999); City of Ypsilanti
v. First Presbyterian Church, 1998 WI. 1993029, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1998) (per
curiam) ("[T]he ordinance is a facially neutral, generally applicable law requiring only
minimal review to determine that prohibiting the free exercise of religion is not the object
of the ordinance but merely the incidental effect.").
200 See, e.g., First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 180-81.
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compelling state interest."' For example, in 1992, in First Covenant
Church v. City of Seattle, the Washington Supreme Court held that Seat-
tle's Landmarks Preservation Ordinance was neither neutral nor gen-
erally applicable. 202 First Covenant sued for declaratory relief when
the Seattle Preservation Committee conferred landmark status to a
church building, alleging the designation burdened the congrega-
tion's free exercise of religion." 8 "Because the sites, improvements,
and objects they govern are arbitrarily selected, and the selection pro-
cess requires individual evaluation of each building, site or improve-
ment," the court distinguished the ordinance from the generally ap-
plicable criminal law in Smith.204 In addition, the ordinance lacked
neutrality because it alluded to religious facilities and included a li-
turgical exception. 245
St. Bartholomew's and First Covenant demonstrate how Smith's ambi-
guity left leeway for different interpretations of what constitutes a neu-
tral law of general applicability. 288 In the latter case, the Washington
Supreme Court distinguished landmark ordinances from the criminal
statute in Smith because such ordinances granted government actors
the power and discretion to choose whether a building would be land-
marked. 2" Advocates for religious property owners concurred and ar-
gued that targeting individual buildings in this manner opposes appli-
cation of the words "generally applicable" to any part of the preserva-
tion scherne. 2Q8 Because the preservation committee applied landmark
20 494 U.S. at 882-84.
402 First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 180-81. The First Covenant Church challenged the con-
stitutionality of landmark status that the Seattle Preservation Committee applied to its
historic religious structure. Id. at 178. Unlike the church in St. Bartholomew's, the Church
here did not attempt to overturn any particular committee decision. Id.
205
204 Id. at 180.
205 Id. at 180-81. The court's treatment of this liturgical exception seems particularly
disingenuous because the lawmakers included it to prevent the preservation committee
from reviewing changes required by the congregation's religious liturgy. Sec id. at 178.
208 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-84. Other than Oregon drug laws, and laws in previous
cases like mandatory Sunday closing laws and social security taxes, Justice Scalia did not
mention what other laws the Court might consider neutral and generally applicable for
Smith purposes, and he also provided no criteria or guiding analysis to make such a deci-
sion. See id.
2° 7 See First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 180; Douglas Laycock, State RFRAS and Land Use Regu-
lation, 32 U.C. Davis L. REV. 755,767 (1999),
208 See, e.g., Carmella, supra note 5, at 479 ("[D]esign control of houses of worship is
neither generally applicable nor religion-neutral,"); Laycock, supra note 207, at 767 ("Land
use regulation is among the most individualized and least generally applicable bodies of
law in our legal system.").
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status only to particular buildings, several property owners argued that
they unfairly bore the burden of maintaining a neighborhood's historic
c harac ter. 2°9
Government officials, however, only decide to landmark buildings
that meet specific threshold criteria, which are predetermined, explicit,
and not religiously motivated. 2I 0
 The decision to landmark does involve
discretion and matters of taste, but, in 1978, in Penn Central Transporta-
tion. Co. v. City of New York Justice Brennan explicitly stated that subjec-
tive elements considered in the landmarking process do not make the
final decision arbitrary. 211
 Rather, like zoning, historic preservation is a
form of land use planning that treats similar property in a similar man-
ner within a generally applicable scheme. 212
 Unlike the Santeria adher-
ents in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, religious
congregations subject to preservation ordinances do not alone bear the
burden of maintaining an area's historic character. 2" The ordinances
apply equally to adherents and non-adherents when their property
meets certain criteria; thus, for Smith purposes, they are generally ap-
plicable laws.214
 In dicta, in 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the U.S. Su-
preme Court itself referred to the preservation ordinance at issue as a
law of general application. 2 t 5
 Therefore, although earnest, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court was misguided when it concluded that preserva-
tion ordinances lack general applicability.216
266 See Carmella, supra note 5, at 479-81.
210 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132 ("[T] he New York City law embodies a comprehen-
sive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be
found in the city „ .."); St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354; Nelson, supra note 5, at 733-34;
see, e.g., CHI., ILL., !ADD. CODE § 2-120-620 (1987), available at http://www.cityofchicago.
org/Landmarks/pdf/Landmarks_Ordinance.pdf.
211 438 U.S. at 132-33. justice Brennan stressed that the designation of landmark status
can be challenged in court as an arbitrary government action, and that courts were just as
able to make that determination in the preservation context as in any other field. Id. Thus,
no increased danger exists that cities will apply preservation laws haphazardly. See id.
212
 Id. at 131-32.
233 Nelson, supra note 5, at 734; see supra notes 137-148 and accompanying text.
214 See Hiakah, 508 U.S. 520, 542-44 (1993); Nelson, supra note 5, at 734-35.
210 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997). The Court stated:
[N]umerous state laws, such as the zoning regulations at issue here, impose a
substantial burden on a large class of individuals. When the exercise of relig-
ion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law of general application, it
does not follow that the persons affected have been burdened any more than
other citizens, let alone burdened because of their religious beliefs.
Id. (emphasis added).
216 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 740, 760; supra notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
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As to neutrality, preservation ordinances are both facially and sub-
stantively neutral as required by Hialeah. 217 On their face, they do not
specifically target religious beliefs, groups, or practices for discrimina-
tion.218 In effect, preservation commissions do not "gerrymander"
preservation ordinances to target particular religious conduct like the
laws in Hialeah, and they do not apply them to religious buildings at the
exclusion of secular structures.219 Finally, commissions do not apply
landmark status only to property owners motivated by religious be-
lief.225 Therefore, though Smith may have been vague, careful consid-
eration of the Court's opinion mandates that future courts consider
preservation ordinances as neutral and generally applicable laws. 221
D. The Effect of Smith 's Individualized Exemption Exception on the Free
Exercise/Histaric Preservation Conflict
If the law in question is neutral and generally applicable, the sec-
ond determination courts must make under Smith is whether it fits into
one of the exceptions Justice Scalia articulated in the majority opin-
ion.222 Unfortunately, the Smith Court neglected to articulate the scope
of the exceptions presented, leaving future courts wide latitude in de-
termining what laws implicate hybrid rights or have in place a system of
individualized exemptions. 225 Hence, courts considering clashes be-
tween free exercise and historic preservation that would prefer to sub-
ject the law in question to strict scrutiny often determine it fits within
one of the Smith exceptions. 224 As evidenced by the cases decided be-
fore Smith, once the state is required to show a compelling government
interest, the congregation alleging the free exercise burden will be ex-
empt from honoring the municipality's preservation ordinance. 225
In Smith, Justice Scalia distinguished Sherbert by carving out an
exception to the Court's ruling for laws that have in place a system of
217 Sec 508 U.S. at 533-34.
215 See, e.g., Cm., ILL., MUN.' CODE § 2-120-620 (1987), available at
h ttp://www.cityofchicago.org/ Landmarks/pdf/Landmarks_Ord in an cespdf.
219 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 734.
22° See id.
221 See id. at 734-35; supra notes 210-220 and accompanying text.
222 See 494 U.S. at 881-84.
225 Nelson, supra note 5, at 740, 749-50; see Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-84.
2" See, e.g., Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Stipp, 879,885 (D. Md. 1996) (con-
cluding that the Cumberland preservation ordinance had in place a system of individual-
ized exemptions).
225 See supra notes 170-186 and accompanying text.
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individualized exemptions not present in the Oregon peyote law. 226
South Carolina's unemployment scheme, in Sherbert, had an exemp-
tion-granting process that vested a high degree of discretion in gov-
ernment officials to determine who could be exempt from the statu-
tory requirements for unemployment compensation. 227 According to
Justice Scalia, the Sherbert Court required strict scrutiny of the denial
of unemployment benefits resulting from Sherbert's religious conduct
because the government's open-ended discretion could have resulted
in religious discrimination.228 Courts, acting with little guidance as to
whether the scope of this exception extends beyond the unemploy-
ment context, have disagreed on whether preservation ordinances
contain a system of individualized exemptions. 229
The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law had an economic
hardship provision in place, which allowed for exemptions from land-
mark designation upon the demonstration of financial hardship, when
the Second Circuit decided St. Bartholomew's in 1990.2" The Church
had even availed itself of that provision, but the Landmarks Commis-
sion determined it did not prove the necessary hardship and upheld
the denial of the permit. 23 ' Therefore, the court knew that the Com-
mission had the discretion, based on a careful review of a property
owner's finances, to grant an exception to the Landmarks Law.232 When
deciding the case, however, the Second Circuit did not even consider
whether the preservation ordinance fit within the individualized ex-
emption exception articulated in Smith. 2" It is likely, as has been ar-
gued since, that the court felt that the exception was too targeted to
include preservation laws. 234
 The "good cause" standard that had guided
the exemption-granting process in Sherbert—allowing anyone to be de-
226 See 494 U.S. at 894 ("The Sherbert test, it must be recalled, was developed in a con-
text that lent itself to individualized government assessment of the reasons for the relevant
conduct.").
227 374 U.S. at 400-01.
228 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85.
223 Compare St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 355 (deciding that the New York City preser-
vation ordinance was a neutral law of general applicability that fits under the neutral Smith
analysis), with Keeler, 940 F. Supp. at 885 (holding that the Cumberland preservation ordi-
nance had in place a system of individualized exemptions and thus was an exception to
Smith that should be subjected to strict scrutiny).
2" 914 F.2d at 352.
231 Id.
232 See id.
299
	 id. at 353-56.
291
	 supra note 5, at 746 ("[Elconomic hardship exemptions utilized in historic
preservation ordinances are not open-ended and therefore do not invite discrimination on
the basis of religion.").
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nied unemployment for a "good cause"—had provided an easy opportu-
nity for the government worker to discriminate, and forced the Court to
apply strict scrutiny to counter the broad delegation of power. 235 The
discretion of the preservation board in St. Bartholomew's, however, was
limited to consideration of detailed economic criteria. 235 Accordingly,
the court correctly applied the Smith standard because the decision-
maker was unable to impinge upon the property owner's First Amend-
ment rights. 237
In contrast, in 1996, in Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland concluded that Cumberland's
preservation ordinance did have in place a system of individualized ex-
emptions. 238 In .feler, Cardinal William H. Keeler sued on behalf of the
Sts. Peter and Paul Roman Catholic Church when the City of Cumber-
land denied the church's request to tear down the monastery and
chapel. 239 The historic chapel and monastery, in serious disrepair, not
only drained the church's funds, but also inadequately met the needs
of the current congregation. 24° The district court determined that the
individualized exemptions in the Cumberland ordinance gave the city
the discretion to grant exemptions from preservation laws for the fol-
lowing reasons: 1) financial hardships; 2) deterrents to major im-
provement programs; and 3) structures whose preservation would not
serve the general welfare.241 These provisions distinguished Cumber-
land's ordinance from the across-the-board criminal prohibition of pe-
266 Id. at 743; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 ("The 'good cause' standard created a
mechanism for individualized exemptions." (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708
(1986))).
266 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 743. The Commission on Chicago Landmarks has de-
tailed criteria laid out in their Rules and Regulations to guide their consideration of appli-
cants for the economic hardship exception. COMM'N ON CIO, LANDMARKS, RULES AND
REGULAtiONS, art. V (1990), available at hup://www.cityofchicago.org/Landmarks/pdf/
Landmarks_Ordinance.pdf. The Commission must consider the current level of economic
return on the property and the feasibility of profitable alternatives by looking through the
financial records of the property owner and estimates from architects and engineers. Id.
2" See Nelson, supra note 5, at 743-45.
"a 940 F. Supp. at 885. The court decided the case when RFRA was still valid law, and
the Church also stated a cause of action tinder RFRA. Id. at 880. The district court, how-
ever, anticipating the U.S. Supreme Court's upcoming decision, found RFRA unconstitu-
tional and relied on Smith to decide the case. Id. at 880-81.
2" Id. at 880. Because the church and monastery comprised part of the Washington
Street Historic District, the ordinance required the Church to submit demolition plans to
the Cumberland Historic Preservation Commission. Id.
240 See id. at 883.
"I Id. at 886.
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yote use in Smith.242
 Because the ordinance fell squarely within a Smith
exception, the district court required the government to show a com-
pelling interest for its refusal to grant an exemption for religious hard-
ship when exemptions from landmark status were available for secular
reasons."' Applying strict scrutiny was determinative because the court,
like all other courts ever considering the issue, determined that historic
preservation was not a compelling government interest?'"
Where Hialeah provided guidance to courts on how to analyze.
whether laws were neutral or generally applicable, no analogous case
exists to guide the determination of the meaning of the individual-
ized exemption exception."' Despite the differences between the un-
fettered discretion employed by government officials in Sherbert and
the guided decision making of preservation boards, the Keeler court
read Smith broadly, and held that the preservation ordinance at issue
contained individualized exemptions. 246 The Keeler court's analysis is
suspect because, if a court stretched the individualized exemption ex-
ception to include preservation laws, the other laws that the exception
would include would almost entirely swallow Smith's holding.247
 If read
literally to apply to any law with an enumerated exception to its main
proposition, rather than limited to discretionary exemptions like Sher-
bert's "good cause" standard, so many laws would be subject to the
compelling interest test that Smith itself would become meaningless. 248
It is unlikely that justice Scalia and the Smith majority intended to cre-
242 Id. ("The ordinance embodies a legislative judgment that the City's interest in his-
toric preservation should, under certain circumstances, give way to other interests ....").
213 Keeler, 940 F. Supp. at 886.
244 Id. ("[Tlhe City nowhere asserts that historic preservation is a compelling interest
of government."); see, e.g., First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 185 ("Preservation ordinances further
cultural and esthetic interests, but they do not protect public health or safety."); Berg,
supra note 172, at 429.
245 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 740.
248 See supra notes 238-244 and accompanying text; see also Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The
Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions From Smith, 74 N.Y.U.
L. Ray. 1045,106'7 (2000).
242 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 246, at 1067. Kaplan stated:
If the holding in Keeler—that where the government provides an exception to
its landmark preservation laws for secular reasons, it must also extend excep-
tions for religious reasons—was correct, then the holding in Smith would
surely have been that where government exempts from prohibition certain
secular, medical uses of drugs, it is required to exempt religious uses as well.
Id.
248 See id. In addition, under this analysis, a planning commission that allowed a zoning
variance for secular reasons would have to show a compelling interest if it denied a vari-
ance for religious reasons. See id.
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ate an exception that vastly weakened Smith, particularly in light of
their concern that exemptions to neutral laws would allow a citizen
"to become a law unto himself."249 In addition, the Smith Court chose
not to overrule Sherbert, but to limit it through the individualized ex-
emption exception—an exception the Court applied only in the un-
employment context. 25° Therefore, the intent of the Court in Smith
argues against the Keeler court's broad reading of the law and supports
preservationists' notion that the economic hardship provisions in
preservation ordinances do not implicate the individualized exemp-
tion exception. 251
E. The Effects .
 of Smith 's Hybrid Rights Exception on the Free
Exercise/Historic Preservation Conflict
Justice Scalia articulated a second exception to Smith's basic hold-
ing—the hybrid rights exception—that is implicated when free exer-
cise concerns are coupled with another constitutional infringe-
ment. 252 The Smith Court again failed to articulate adequately the
scope of the exception and left another area of the law important to
the free exercise debate open for disparate interpretation. 253 Accord-
ingly, a circuit split has emerged over the meaning of the hybrid rights
formula articulated in Smith.254 Despite all this activity in the lower
"9 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) ). Justice
Scalia's language shows his reluctance to provide citizens with exemptions to generally
applicable laws. See id.
25° See id. at 883-84. Justice Scalia emphasized in Smith that the Sherbert test has never
been used to invalidate any government action besides the denial of unemployment
benefits and seemed inclined to limit its application to that context. Sec id. ("Even if we
were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation
field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal
law.").
251 Nelson, supra note 5, at 747.
252 494 U.S. at 881.
255 Compare St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 355 (deciding that the New York City's Land-
marks Law was neutral and generally applicable for Smith purposes), with First Covenant,
840 P.2d at 181-82 (concluding that Seattle's Landmarks Preservation Ordinance impli-
cated hybrid rights).
25"
	
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and District of Columbia Circuits acknowl-
edge hybrid rights only when there is an independently viable constitutional claim along
with the free exercise allegation. SeeThomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d
692, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (holding that the addition of an Establishment Clause violation implicated the
hybrid rights exception); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir.
1995) (noting the absence of an independent substantive due process claim prevented
consideration under the hybrid rights exception)). The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits require only a colorable claim that must not stand independ-
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courts, few courts have considered in detail whether preservation or-
dinances implicate the hybrid rights exception. 255
The Washington Supreme Court was willing to tackle the issue
and, in First Covenant, it concluded that the Seattle preservation ordi-
nance implicated the hybrid rights exception because the ordinance
also burdened the congregation's free speech. 256
 The Washington court
noted that speech can be nonverbal if it is "sufficiently imbued with
elements of coinmunication."257
 Because congregations build houses of
worship to convey a religious message, and First Covenant itself claimed
its church building was "an expression of Christian belief and message,"
the court held that church architecture was equivalent to religious
speech. 258
 Accordingly, because the free exercise burden was coupled
with an infringement on free speech, the preservation ordinance im-
plicated hybrid rights. 259
 Because it was held to be an exception to
Smith, the court subjected the preservation law to strict scrutiny and
concluded it did not serve a compelling government interest. 26°
Advocates for religious property owners also argue that preserva-
tion ordinances implicate constitutional rights other than free exer-
cise rights when applied to houses of worship. 261
 They claim that ar-
chitectural changes that have followed in the wake of doctrinal
changes prove that a house of worship is both a profession of faith
and religious speech. 262
 The physical arrangement of both the exte-
ently, but must be more than a simple allegation. Id. at 703 (citing Swanson v. Guthrie
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (requiring a "colorable claim
of infringement" to implicate the hybrid rights exception)). The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit does not accept that the hybrid rights argument is a viable exception to
Smith and articulated it will recognize the exception only upon further instruction by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 704 (citing Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs, of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d
177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (calling the hybrid rights exception "completely illogical" and
refusing to consider its application)).
255 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 751-52.
256 840 P.2d at 182.
257 Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
256
 Sec id.; see also Carmella, supra note 5, at 490-98.
256
 Fint Covenant, 840 P.2d at 181-82.
266 Id. at 182-83.
261 See, e.g., Carmella, supra note 5, at 478, 492-93.
262 Id. at 452-65. One particularly powerful example of the symbiotic relationship be-
tween religion and architecture includes the radical modifications early Protestants made
to previously Catholic churches. Id. at 457-58. The longitudinal basilica plan, which fo-
cused attention on the altar where the Eucharist had been consecrated, was not suitable
for Protestant worship. Id. Therefore, basilica forms were rejected and replaced with
churches with central one-room plans that focused the congregation's attention toward
the reading of the gospel from the pulpit. Id. at 459. Thus, the centrality of the Word was
embodied in the physical arrangement of both the interior and exterior of the building.
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rior and interior of a religious structure, therefore, conveys messages
of faith to its congregation that the state should not alter. 263 In add-
tion, design control of religious structures allegedly implicates the
Establishment Clause because it unconstitutionally entangles the gov-
ernment in the congregation's religious affairs.264 Architectural
choices made in design review affect the messages conveyed by a relig-
ious structure and, in turn, affect the congregation's spiritual forma-
tion.266 As a result, a preservation committee's choices may require it
to take sides in a religious dispute when that dispute involves ecclesi-
astical design choices.268
Preservationists rebut these theoretical assertions with the reality
that no court, besides the Washington Supreme Court, has considered
architecture a form of protected speech—religious or otherwise. 267 If
courts accepted the "architecture-as-speech" proposition, they would
also be required to subject zoning ordinances to strict scrutiny. 268 Ac-
cordingly, a municipality's land use capabilities would be severely hin-
dered because it would have to grant exemptions for any minor eco-
nomic burdens suffered by religious property owners resulting from
the application 'of a zoning ordinance. 269 Preservationists argue that,
as with the individualized exemption exception, the Smith majority
See Carmella, supra note 5, at 459. Even today, theologian Paul Tillich observes: "Churches
that retain a central aisle leading to a removed altar as the holiest place, separated from
other parts of the building, are essentially un-Protestant.... 101nly by the creation of new
forms can Protestant churches achieve an honest expression of their faith." Id. at 472-73
(quoting Paul Tillich, On the Theology of Fine Art and Architecture, in ON ART AND ARCII ritc-
Tula 204 ( J. Dillenberger &J. Dillenberger eds., 1989) (alteration in original)).
263 See id. at 471 ("Architecture for churches is a matter of gospel."); cf. Hurley v. Irish-
Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 568-69 (1995) (holding that the choice
of whom to allow to march in a St. Patrick's Day parade was a communicative expression
warranting First Amendment protection).
264 Carmella, supra note 5, at 478-79.
265 See id. at 506-07.
266 See id. at 489.
262 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 750 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has never sug-
gested that architectural expression requires the same protections as personal decisions,
like the right to educate one's children); cf. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309
F.3d 144, 164 (3d Cir. 2002) (comparing the eruv, a delimited space used to designate
sacred areas for Orthodox Jews, with "the walls forming a synagogue," and holding that an
eruv is not communicative for First Amendment purposes), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2609
(2003) (mem.).
266 Courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have recognized the analogous nature
of zoning and historic preservation ordinances. See, e.g.. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131-33.
269 cf. Bethlehem Evangelical, 626 P.2d at 672-73 (upholding the zoning ordinance
against a free exercise challenge that constituted only a minor economic burden on the
religious property owner because the zoning law represented a substantial government
interest).
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created the hybrid rights exception to distinguish precedent and not
to swallow Smith's basic holding. 27° The Washington Supreme Court
incorrectly concluded that historic preservation ordinances implicate
hybrid rights because the Smith majority intended courts to narrowly
construe the hybrid rights exception. 2"
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE FREE EXERCISE/
HISTORIC PRESERVATION CONFLICT AND A PROPOSAL
FOR A MORE ADEQUATE BALANCE OF FREE EXERCISE
RIGHTS AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION INTERESTS
A. Analysis of the Failure of Employment Division v. Smith
in Free Exercise Challenges to Preservation Ordinances
Until the U.S. Supreme Court decides the constitutionality of
RLUIPA, Employment Division v. Smith is controlling and courts must
judge any free exercise claim guided by its holding. 272
 If interpreted as
intended by the majority, courts considering whether a particular
preservation ordinance burdens free exercise will find for the local
government because they will decide that preservation laws are neu-
tral and generally applicable. 275
 Therefore, courts will uphold these
ordinances because they incidentally burden religion and do not tar-
get it directly. 274
 Many scholars and courts do not find this result satis-
fying because the Smith decision does not provide sufficient free exer-
cise protection in general and, in particular, endangers the rights of
minority religious groups. 275
 If the government refuses a permit for an
addition to house a new liturgical practice and instead works with the
church to incorporate the practice in the existing space, free exercise
27° See Kaplan, supra note 246, at 1067 ('The second way in which courts have destabi-
lized, if not eviscerated, the holding of Smith is by applying a very broad interpretation of
the hybrid rights exception.").
211 See id. at 1084 (Ideally, the exception should apply only in cases that closely resem-
ble, both substantively and factually, the so-called 'hybrid' precedents alluded to in
Smith.").
272
 Sec supra notes 111-160 and accompanying text.
273 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 871, 892 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("['T] he Court holds that where the law is a generally applicable criminal prohibition, our
usual free exercise jurisprudence does not even apply."); supra notes 187-221 and accom-
panying text.
274 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-80.
273
 See, e.g., First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187 (Wash. 1992);
Mykkeltvedt, supra note 154, at 608; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 892 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
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concerns become very rea1. 276 First, by denying the permit, the com-
mission interferes with the church's ability to celebrate its liturgy how
it chooses.277 Second, by working with the church, the commission
creates an atmosphere of worship catered to its own desires and per-
haps in violation of the congregation's wishes. 278 Though religion it-
self is not purposefully targeted by preservation laws, Smith is certainly
underinclusive in its religious protections because it provides no re-
lief, or even consideration, to congregations finding themselves in the
bind articulated above. 279
 The Smith analysis requires courts to focus
only on the nature of the law—whether it is neutral and generally ap-
plicable—and pays no heed to the detrimental effect of the contested
law on religious faith or conduct. 28°
If 	 of the Smith exceptions is determined to govern, or RLUIPA
is found constitutional, however, the legal analysis is equally unsatisfac-
tory.281 The court will apply strict scrutiny and any preservation ordi-
. nance burdening a religious structure will fail because it was not en-
acted to protect the public's health or safety. 282 Accordingly, the court
will grant all religious property owners exemptions from historic pres-
ervation laws, even for the most minor religious burdens, and create
free exercise protections that are overinclusive. 285 If this Sherbert/Yoder
standard governs, it will result in the alteration of important historic
buildings for what are, in essence, economic reasons. 284 For example, a
planning board's refusal to allow vinyl siding on a church does not en-
2" See Smith, 494 U.S. at 893-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It is difficult to deny that
a law that prohibits religiously motivated conduct, even if the law is generally applicable,
does not at least implicate First Amendment concerns."); Carmella, supra note 5, at 492,
494.
2" See Carmella, supra note 5, at 494.
478 See id. at 494-95.
479 See id. at 422-23 ("Smith simply ignores the impact of general, secular laws on reli-
gious communities.").
288 See 494 U.S. at 878-79.
201 See infra notes 282-294 and accompanying text.
282 See, e.g., First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 185 ("Preservation ordinances further cultural
and esthetic interests, but they do not protect public health or safety.").
283 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 729-30,750. Throughout her article, Nelson articulates
that the so-called "free exercise" burdens alleged by religious congregations are really eco-
nomic inconveniences. See id. Therefore, applying Sherbert v. Verner will result in exemp-
tions for purely economic (and secular) reasons. See id. at 729-30,
284 Id.; cf. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348,355 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that economic burdens, even if substantial, do not implicate free exercise
rights because they do not burden the religious beliefs or expressions of the adherent).
For a discussion of the Sherbert/Yoder standard, see supra notes 95-113 and accompanying
text.
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mesh the government in church affairs, control the focus of a congre-
gation's worship, or compel the church to make any religious procla-
mations,285
 Yet, absent a compelling government interest, a court apply-
ing strict scrutiny would consider such a small burden to be sufficient
grounds for an exemption, resulting in permitting a church to put vinyl
siding (or anything else) on a historic religious property. 286 In addition,
granting exemptions for•purely economic burdens may also implicate
the Establishment Clause because it involves treating similarly situated
groups differently based on their religious beliefs. 287
 Granting exemp-
tions to religious property owners may constitute government support
of religion because courts would not grant non-religious property own-
ers the same exemptions. 286
The literature attempting to make sense of the clash between his-
toric preservation and free exercise rights typically advocates for either
the under- or over-inclusive legal analysis the courts already employ. 289
Preservationists rely on the Smith analysis to uphold the government's
historic preservation interests against the free exercise claims of relig-
ious congregations."° Advocates for religious groups attempt to move
the analysis to the Sherbert standard by either refusing to apply Smith or
by placing preservation ordinances into one of its two exceptions—the
hybrid rights or individualized exemption exceptions."' A satisfactory
2e6 See First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Ridgefield Historic Dist. Comm'n, 738 A.2d
224, 231 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) ("The commission's decision has not interfered with
the right of the plaintiffs or its members to express their religious views, or associate and
assemble for that purpose."), affil, 737 A.2d 989 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
288 See Sherbert v Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (requiring a state to show a compel.
ling interest in any law that burdens the free exercise of religion); First Covenant, 840 P.2d
at 185 (articulating that historic preservation is not a compelling government interest);
Berg, supra note 172, at 929.
287 Nelson, supra note 5, at 761. In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lemon u Kurtzman
articulated that to pass constitutional muster, any government action must: 1) serve a secu-
lar purpose; 2) have a primary effect that neither inhibits nor advances religion; and 3)
avoid excessive state entanglement with religion. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Nelson
argues that judicially granted exemptions to preservation laws under the Free Exercise
Clause violate the second prong of the Lemon test because such exemptions benefit only
religious adherents that worship in a communal structure. Nelson, supra note 5, at 766-67.
288 Nelson, supra note 5, at 766-67.
288 Compare Carmella, supra note 5, at 402-04 ("This article contends that governmen-
tal design control of houses of worship violates both the free exercise and establishment
clauses of the first amendment."), with Nelson, supra note 5, at 722-24 ("United States
Supreme Court precedent strongly supports those courts that have determined historic
preservation laws to be 'neutral laws of general applicability,' and presumptively valid un-
der the constitutional standard employed by the Court.").
280 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 5, at 731-32.
291 See, e.g., Carmella, supra note 5, at 902-04.
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and pragmatic solution seems to elude all who attempt to resolve this
conflict of interests because courts and scholars alike remain polarized,
clinging blindly to either Madison's or Jefferson's conception of the
scope of free exercise rights. 292
 Though having its own drawbacks, the
best solution entails courts making an ad hoc factual inquiry into each
set of circumstances that implicates this conflict. 293
 Only through a
close examination of each factual situation can a court determine
whether the First Amendment requires an exemption from a preserva-
tion ordinance for a religious property owner. 291
B. A Proposal for a Case by Case Balancing Test That Provides a
More Equitable Judicial Analysis for Free Exercise and
Historic Preservation Conflicts
As described above, no legal test yet conceived under the federal
constitution adequately has balanced constitutionally protected free
exercise rights with constitutionally sanctioned historic preservation
interests.295
 The conceptions of neither Jefferson nor Madison ade-
quately determine the scope of free exercise rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment, and the tests courts use based on these two phi-
losophies are either under- or over-inclusive of free exercise rights. 29°
Therefore, it seems that only through a case by case balancing test can
a court adequately consider the interests of both the government and
the religious congregation. 297
Judicial balancing tests can be onerous because they involve de-
tailed consideration of the facts of each particular case—including
economic, social, and religious issues that judges may be reluctant to
consider—and also lack bright-line rules that courts can easily ap-
ply. 298
 In addition, balancing tests can create difficulties for those
292 Compare St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354-56 (following Jefferson's conception of
the Free Exercise Clause and allowing government to burden religious conduct as long as
beliefs are protected), with First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 182-83 (following Madison's beliefs
and requiring a compelling interest for any burden inflicted upon religious conduct).
203 Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,124-25 (1978) (articu-
lating standards to consider in an ad hoc evaluation of whether the New York City Land-
marks Law was a taking under the Fifth Amendment).
291 See infra notes 304-355 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 272-294 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 272-294 and accompanying text.
297 Cf. Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24 (explaining the necessity to resort to a balanc-
ing test when the Court is "unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'jus-
tice and fairness' require" the Court to declare that the government has effected a taking
(quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,594 (1962)) ).
298
 See infra notes 299-355 and accompanying text.
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looking to precedent for guidance because the cases often turn on
minute factual distinctions. Despite their difficulties, justice re-
quires courts to apply a balancing test when religious congregations
challenge preservation laws on free exercise grounds.") Bethlehem
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood and Grosz v. City of Miami
Beach, two cases decided before Smith, show how a court sensibly can
balance historic preservation interests and free exercise concerns."'
Again, these cases considered zoning, but they offer an example of
coherent analysis that allows for the adequate consideration of the
interests of both the government and the religious congregation." 2
As opposed to simply focusing on the law in question or the al-
leged free exercise burden, the Bethlehem Evangelical and Grosz courts
carefully looked at the totality of the conflict."' Using these analyses
as guides, a court deciding whether to uphold the government's in-
terest in the preservation of historic religious properties against a
congregation's free exercise allegation should consider 1) the charac-
ter of the free exercise burden; 2) the impact on the religious con-
gregation if the decision of the preservation committee is upheld; 3)
the nature and necessity of the alteration being proposed; 4) the ar-
29g In Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, the Eleventh Circuit stated: "Balancings must avoid
constitutionalizing secularity or sectarianizing the Constitution. In this area, where relig-
ions guarantees of the Constitution compete with the rights of government to perform its
function in the modern era, certitude is difficult to attain." 721 F.2d 729, 741 (11th Cir.
1983). Considering the uncertainties and inconsistencies courts have already created in
this area, a balancing test certainly would not make the outcomes of these conflicts any less
predictable. See supra notes 187-271 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 272-294 and accompanying text. Despite the ongoing and charged
debate over free exercise rights and historic preservation, the number of religious prop-
erty owners that actually bring their cases to court is very limited. Weinstein, supra note 6,
at 111-12 (citing informal studies done in New York and Philadelphia showing that most
preservation committees usually granted requests by religious property owners to alter
their property). Therefore, because courts would apply the test in a limited number of
cases, the balancing test would not be that onerous to judges or the court system. See id.
3°1 Sec Grosz, 721 F.2d at 733-41; Bethlehem Evangelica4 626 P.2d 668, 675 (Cob. 1981);
see also supra notes 175-185 and accompanying text.
302 See Grosz, 721 F.2d at 734 ("(Tjhe balance depends upon the cost to the govern-
ment of altering its activity to allow the religious practice to continue unimpeded versus
the cost to the religious interest imposed by the government activity."); Bethlehem Evangeli-
cal, 626 P.2d at 675 ("(Wie must balance the interests involved in the controversy before us
and recognize that the state must show a substantial interest without a reasonable alternate
means of accomplishment ...." (quoting Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth.,
509 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Colo. 1973))). Both courts frame their balancing test as a substantial
interest test, but the courts do engage in a clear balancing of both state and religious in-
terests in both cases. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 733-41; Bethlehem Evangelical, 626 P.2d at 675.
3" See Grosz, 721 F.2d at 733-41; Bethlehem Evangelical, 626 P.2d at 675; see also supra
notes 175-186 and accompanying text.
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chitectural or historic significance of the structure; and 5) the eco-
nomic impact on the community that will result from the loss or al-
teration of the historic structure.944
The first two factors in the balancing test summarize the religious
congregation's interest by considering not only the nature and extent
of the free exercise burden but also the effect of forcing the congre-
gation to pursue other options outside the desired architectural al-
terations."5 The most important factor in the analysis, and also the
most in need of clarification, is the character of the free exercise bur-
den."8
 Although preservation laws never directly burden religious
belief or expression, they do burden religious congregations by plac-
ing demands on their resources, or by forcing growing congregations
to remain in smaller, older buildings."7 The basis of most alleged free
exercise burdens in the preservation context, therefore, is really eco-
nomic.308 Accordingly, a court must first determine the threshold
question of whether the economic burden should be considered a
304 As to the first two factors, the Grosz court stated: "The importance of the burdened
practice within the particular religion's doctrines and the degree of interference caused by
the government both figure into the calculus." 721 F.2d at 735. The court also emphasized
the need to determine whether the law in question does indeed burden a religious prac-
tice. Id. at 735-36. The court in Bethlehem Evangelical differentiated between condemning a
church in slum clearance, which resulted in the complete destruction of the church, and
the situation at bar, in which the committee required the Church to upgrade the streets
surrounding its property, clearly a much less onerous burden. 626 P.2d at 675. As to factors
three through five, the Grosz court urged consideration of the underlying policy interest of
the government's action and of the potential injury to those policy interests if the court
granted an exemption. 721 F.2d at 734. In addition, the court required consideration of
other means to effectuate the government's end that would lessen the alleged burden. Id.
In Bethlehem Evangelical, the court considered the reasonableness of the government regu-
lation and the validity of the end stipulated by the City. See 626 P.2d at 675.
306 See infra notes 306-342 and accompanying text.
306 See infra notes 307-336 and accompanying text.
307 See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 93; see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
511-12 (1997) (discussing Church's need to expand because the church building could
not accommodate some forty-sixty parishioners at Sunday masses); St. Bartholomew's, 914
F.2d at 351-52 (discussing Church's desire to tear down its community house and replace
it with a forty-seven story office tower to generate revenue and provide room for its pro-
grams); Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Stipp. 879,880-81 (D. Md. 1996) (discuss-
ing Church's desire to tear down historic monastery and chapel that were "a draining
financial liability."). But see Carmella, supra note 5, at 498-99 (asserting that design review
does directly burden religious expression).
308 See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
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sufficient free exercise infringement to be balanced against the mu-
nicipality's historic preservation interests. 309
Consideration of two cases already discussed provides two possi-
ble alternatives to guide this threshold consideration in the proposed
balancing test. 3" Under the Smith standard, the determination of
whether a law actually burdened free exercise hinged on "whether the
claimant has been denied the ability to practice his religion or co-
erced in the nature of those practices." 311 Following Smith, as seen
above, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 1990, in
St. Bartholomew's held that neutral regulations that diminish the in-
come of religious organizations were not free exercise violations.312
Thus, the court concluded that the denial of significant revenue did
not implicate free exercise rights even when, as the Church alleged,
the denial forced cuts in many charitable programs. 313 The ordi-
nances imposed economic harms that simply made the practice of
religion more expensive, and, therefore, they were not unconstitu-
tional because they did not infringe directly upon religious beliefs. 3 t4
In contrast, in 1992, in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, the
Washington Supreme Court conceded that moderate and generally
applicable burdens like a sales tax did not implicate free exercise con-
cerns. 315 The court reasoned, as previously discussed, that a more on-
erous financial burden, even if caused by a generally applicable law,
could violate free exercise rights if it severely restrained religious ac-
tivity.316 The court concluded that landmark designation "so grossly
diminishes the value of the Church's principal asset" that it unconsti-
tutionally burdened the congregation's free exercise of religion, and
it granted an exemption to the preservation ordinance. 317 Other relig-
509
 For a discussion of the necessity of such a threshold requirement, see Colin L.
Black, Note, The Free Exercise Clause and Historic Preservation Law: Suggestions for a More Coher-
ent Free Exercise Analysis, 72 Tut_ L. REV. 1767, 1792-93 (1998).
310 Sec infra notes 311-336 and accompanying text.
3" St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 355 (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Pro-
tective Ass'n, 485 U.S: 439, 450-51 (1988)).
512 Id. (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries V. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389-90
(1990)).
313
 Sec id.
314 Id.; see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961) (upholding a manda-
tory Sunday closing law against Orthodox Jews who closed their stores on Saturday to
honor their Sabbath, thus requiring them to close two days a week and suffer a draining
financial burden).
513 840 P.2d at 183 (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 389-90).
516 Id. ("It is plain that a religious organization needs funds to remain a going con-
cern." (citing Murdock v. Commonwealth, 319 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1943)) ).
3117 Id. at 184.
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ious congregations also advocated for a broader understanding of
free exercise because they believed the charitable and educational
missions affected by preservation ordinances were equivalent to ex-
pressions of religious belief.518 Therefore, they characterized regula-
tions that affect such enterprises as free exercise burdens equivalent
to the suppression or coercion of religion. 319 •
The First Covenant articulation that economic burdens that extend
beyond a mere nuisance can be legitimate free exercise burdens is the
more appropriate analysis for this balancing test. 320 By considering a
broader scope of economic burdens, the proposed balancing test hon-
ors the Constitution's explicit protection of religious freedom. 521 Al-
though the U.S. Supreme Court also protects historic preservation in-
terests, the sacred place religious freedom holds in United States his-
tory requires any doubt in this balance be resolved in favor of free
exercise rights. 322 Therefore, even when a religious congregation ar-
ticulates a burden that seems solely economic on its face, if it imposes
more than a minor economic hardship, the court would balance the
interest against the opposing preservation concern.523
In addition, allowing a broad articulation of free exercise burdens
complies with the Court's mandate to protect the separation of church
and state.324 In Smith, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the role
of the judiciary does not include considering at length the centrality of
a practice or act to a particular religion. 325 Hence, any appropriate ju-
dicial balance considering competing preservation and free exercise
interests should require little, if any, judicial inquiry into what acts are
necessary to the religious beliefs of any congregation.52° By forcing
courts to balance any economic burden imposed upon religious prop-
erty owners that extends beyond a mere nuisance, this balancing test, in
accord with Smith, keeps the judiciary from deciding what building
318 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew s, 914 F.2d at 353-54; Keeler, 940 F. Supp. at 880-81; see also
Carmella, supra note 5, at 406-07.
S19 See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 353-54; Keeler; 940 F. Supp. at 880-81.
320 See infra notes 321-336 and accompanying text.
321 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
323 See supra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
323 See infra notes 328-336 and accompanying text,
524 See infra notes 325-327 and accompanying text.
323 494 U.S. at 887 ("Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that
courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the
plausibility of a religious claim.").
525 See id.
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plans, architectural symbols, etc. have religious meaning to a congrega-
tion . 327
As applied, this threshold consideration would rule out alleged
free exercise burdens that are purely secular concerns. 328 For exam-
ple, in 1998, in First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Ridgefield, the Church
alleged that the preservation committee's veto of the congregation's
plan to vinyl side the church was a free exercise burden. 3  Under the
First Covenant analysis, the refusal to alloW vinyl siding on a church is
more equivalent to the burden imposed by a sales tax than to any-
thing that actually could implicate religious belief or expression."° It
is difficult to imagine that the costs of maintaining the clapboard ex-
terior posed significant financial burdens beyond the typical recur-
ring maintenance costs any property owner faces."' Accordingly, tin-
der the proposed balancing test, a court would conclude that the
burden is purely economic, and the free exercise challenge would
fail. 332
 In a case like St. Bartholomew's, where the economic loss im-
posed by the preservation law allegedly required cutting church pro-
grams and charitable missions, there is a potential free exercise bur-
den because such losses may implicate religious belief or expres-
sion. 333
 Even though the Church's new office tower would serve a
purely secular function, the income would be used to enhance the
327 See id.
328
 See infra notes 329-336 and accompanying text. This threshold requirement also
ensures that any exemption granted to a neutral and generally applicable law is given for
religious and not secular reasons. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 729-30. Some have argued
that, in certain cases, courts granting exemptions to historic preservation ordinances vio-
late the Establishment Clause because they grant protections to religious groups when only
economic concerns are at stake—a government preference for religion that violates the
First Amendment. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[TI he statute
has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain.");
Nelson, supra note 5, at 761.
"3 738 A.2d at 231.
33°
 The inquiry turns on a matter of degree, and an economic burden that does not
extend beyond a mere nuisance like a sales tax cannot be considered a true free exercise
burden. Jim toy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 389-90.
331 Cf. Nelson, supra note 5, at 729-30 (arguing that the hardships preservation ordi-
nances place on religious property owners are analogous to the burdens placed on non-
religious property owners).
3" If the Free Exercise Clause is not implicated, then the religious congregation has
only a takings claim, which should be analyzed under the "charitable purpose" test of Trus-
tees of Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (App. Div. 1968) (holding that a
historic preservation ordinance as applied to a nonprofit organization may be unconstitu-
tional if it physically or financially prevents the carrying out of the organization's charita-
ble purpose).
333 See 914 F.2d at 351.
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worship and activities of the congregation necessary for its vitality as a
religious community. 5" The financial burden imposed by the preser-
vation ordinance in this case is much more onerous than a trifling
nuisance like a sales tax because it arguably implicates religious ex-
pression."5 Accordingly, the alleged burden would pass the threshold
consideration, and the court would next weigh that burden against
the City's historic preservation interests, 355
The second factor in the proposed balancing test considers the
congregation's alternatives in meeting its desired end without altering
its historic structure." 7 .For example, if an overcrowded house of wor-
ship is contemplating building an addition, adding additional litur-
gies could solve the problem without altering a historic structure. 355
The existence of what could be considered a viable alternative to
renovation, demolition, or some other course harmful to the building
would weigh heavily in the government's favor." 9
 Likewise, the inabil-
ity to find an alternative to alteration, coupled with an imposition on
the congregation's worship, would weigh much more heavily on the
property owner's side° If the religious practices of a congregation
were severely limited, the court should require that the government's
interest be extremely strong to counteract such a burden."' These
first two factors provide for the adequate judicial consideration of the
free exercise burden that is lacking under the Smith analysis, which
534 See id. at 351-52.
535 See id. at 353.
336 Cf. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 735 ("Courts, therefore, often restrict themselves to determin-
ing whether the challenged conduct is rooted in religious belief or involves only secular,
philosophical or personal choices."). To prevent a searing inquiry into religious affairs,
then, the religious congregation is given a certain amount of deference when it alleges a
free exercise burden that, without much inquiry, seems plausible to the court. See Smith,
494 U.S. at 887.
3" GMT., 721 F.2d at 739 (considering the alternatives for a rabbi who was proscribed
from holding services in his home if the decision of the City was upheld).
355
 See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511-12. Or perhaps, with the help of the city, the struc-
ture could be placed mostly underground so as not to affect the view of the structure. For
a discussion about how compromise between the religious congregation and the city in
question is an effective way to solve this conflict, see Williamson, supra note 62, at 152-54.
5" Grosz, 721 F.2d at 737 (discussing the least restrictive means test, applied to both the
government and the religious property owner, which requires both parties to attempt to
reach their objectives through the least harmful means possible).
345 Cf id. at 736 (articulating the importance of focusing on the degree of interference
caused by the government action); Bethlehem Evangelical, 626 13.2d at 675 (highlighting that
church construction is subject to "reasonable regulations").
541 See Grosz, 721 F.2d at 736.
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considered only the nature of the law in question and not its effect on
the religious property owner.342
The last three factors in this balancing test determine the extent
of a municipality's interest in preserving a historic religious prop-
erty. 34' First, the congregation must present plans to the court that
detail how it proposes to change the historic structure so the court
can consider the visual impact of the proposed alteration. 344 The
greater the change in the structure, the stronger the city's interest is
in maintaining the property in its current state. 345
 In addition, the
court should consider the relationship between the renovated struc-
ture and the surrounding properties—any addition or renovation
should be in keeping with the architectural scale and style of the
neighborhood.346
In determining the building's architectural and historic
significance, the court must consider who built it, its place in Ameri-
can architectural history, and the significant historic events that took
place there. 347
 For the most part, the preservation committee will have
on record the consideration of these factors that took place during
the original determination of whether the building should be desig-
nated a historic landmark. 348
 Although the court should not find
these determinations controlling upon its decision, it should find
readily available information detailing the facts the committee relied
on in initially concluding that the building was worth protecting. 349
342 See supra notes 272-294 and accompanying text.
343 See infra notes 344-355 and accompanying text.
344
 See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MON. CODE § 2.120-740 (1987), available at http://www.cityofchi-
cago.org/Landmarks/pdf/Landmarks_Ordinance.pdf
 (requiring a permit for any physical
alteration of a historic property). Therefore, this information should all be on the record
from the presentation the religious property owner originally made to the preservation
commission. See id.
343 See TYLER, supra note 23. at 22 (discussing the importance in preservation of main-
taining the "historic integrity" of a building and keeping as much original "fabric or fea-
tures" as possible).
346 See id. at 139-40 (discussing the importance of contextualism, a design approach
that encourages compatibility between new and older architecture by encouraging archi-
tects to respect the scale, design and materials of historic buildings).
347 Cf. id. at 93-95 (citing U.S. Dep't of the Interior: Nat'l Register Criteria for Evalua-
tion (2002), at http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/publicationsibulletins/nrb15
 (articulating cri-
teria for applying to the National Register, which is very influential in the designation cri-
teria established by local preservation commissions)).
343
 Sec supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
349 See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-120-620. Allowing the court to consider the records
will save time because it will prevent the necessity of additional findings of fact on the historic
and architectural status of the historic religious property in question. See id. (highlighting the
preservation commission's detailed consideration of historical significance).
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The court should draw its own conclusions about what weight to as-
sign to the building's historic significance when balancing against the
alleged free exercise burden.35°
Finally, the court also should consider the economic impact
granting an exemption to the religious property owner will have on
the community. 351
 The property owner must show the court that its
proposed change will have minimal adverse effect on property values
and tourism in the surrounding area. 352
 If the structure, however,
draws a significant amount of tourism to the city, and the property
owner is proposing to replace it with a parking lot, the religious bur-
den will have to be significant for the court to award an exemption to
the preservation ordinance. 353
 If the structure brings very little reve-
nue to the city, then a minor economic burden might be sufficient to
support a court-granted exemption. 354
 The latter factors in the balanc-
ing test, therefore, provide for an adequate consideration of the gov-
ernment's interest, something missing when strict scrutiny under
Sherbert was the guiding legal framework and preservation rights were
effectively ignored.355
CONCLUSION
Employment Division. v. Smith, the currently binding U.S. Supreme
Court free exercise case, created an inadequate legal framework for
judicial consideration of free exercise and historic preservation
conflicts. Under Smith, courts insufficiently protect free exercise rights
because they do not scrutinize preservation ordinances when they
35° See, e.g., id. A court applying this balancing test would know that the preservation
committee determined the building at issue had historic significance; however, as the
preservation committee would not have considered the issue in balance with the owner's
constitutional rights, its landmark-status determination would not keep the court from
granting an exemption following such balancing. See id.
s51 Cf. Bethlehem Evangelical, 626 P.2d at 674-75 (taking into account the effect on the
community of not requiring the Church to facilitate the free flow of traffic).
352
 Cf. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 735 (considering costs to the community in weighing the ef-
fects of not upholding the zoning ordinance). For a discussion about how historic preser-
vation districts stabilize property values, see TYLER, supra note 23, at 65. Tyler also con-
chides that historic preservation increases tourism, which in turn brings economic benefits
to a community. Id. at 171. Therefore, in determining the government's interest, it is im-
portant to consider the effects that changing the community landscape will have on both
tourism and property values. See id. at 65,171.
353 Cf. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 735 (suggesting that concerns that a religious-based exemp-
tion would be too costly are legitimate reasons for the denial of such an exemption).
554 See id, at 734-35.
355 See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
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burden a congregation's free exercise of religion. If courts conclude
that preservation laws trigger either of the Smith exceptions, however,
they apply strict scrutiny and fail to protect historic preservation in-
terests because they conclude that preservation ordinances never fur-
ther a compelling government interest. Hence, under both interpre-
tations of Smith, either free exercise rights or historic preservation in-
terests are left without adequate judicial protection. Only through the
application of a case by case balancing test, which considers the na-
ture of the free exercise burden and the extent of the government's
interest in preserving the historic religious structure, can courts ade-
quately adjudicate the inevitable free exercise/historic preservation
conflicts. A balancing test will provide courts with the freedom to ana-
lyze each party's situation and ground their decisions in important
social, economic and religious considerations ignored by courts
trapped within Smith's rigid strictures.
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